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PREFACE
When court of appeals judges decide a case, they focus on legal
materials to reach their result. These materials include the case record
compiled in the trial court or agency; the judgment, decision, or
verdict under review from the trial court or agency; the precise issues
that have been raised and preserved by the litigants; the parties’
arguments as reflected in written briefs and oral arguments; the
applicable constitutional, treaty, statutory, rules, or contractual
provisions; the applicable standards of review; and controlling case
precedent where applicable. Because we typically sit and hear cases in
panels of three, appellate judges do not act alone in deciding cases;
rather, we deliberate—often extensively—to determine the correct
result in a case. When the relevant legal materials are uncomplicated,
the issues are uncontroversial, and precedent is clear, judges’
deliberations are straightforward and judgments are easily reached.
Crucially, court of appeals judges understand that, save when the
court sits en banc, we are bound by established circuit precedent. And
we are always bound by Supreme Court precedent in deciding cases.
The essence of the common law doctrine of precedent or stare
decisis is that the rule of the case creates a binding legal precept.
The doctrine is so central to Anglo-American jurisprudence that it
scarcely need be mentioned, let alone discussed at length. A
judicial precedent attaches a specific legal consequence to a
detailed set of facts in an adjudged case or judicial decision,
which is then considered as furnishing the rule for the
determination of a subsequent case involving identical or similar
material facts and arising in the same court or a lower court in the
1
judicial hierarchy.
As Justice Cardozo once said, precedents “fix the point of
2
departure from which the labor of the judge begins.” If precedent
controls the disposition of a pending case, appellate judges must
follow it. It does not matter whether an appellate judge agrees with
established precedent; we are bound to apply established precedent in
deciding cases before us. And this is precisely what most federal
appellate judges faithfully do in exercising their responsibilities on the
bench.

1. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969–70 (3d Cir. 1979).
2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (Yale Univ.
Press 1964) (1921).
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In some cases, however, the matter under review presents an issue
of first impression; or the issue before the court is highly complicated
or controversial; or there is no clearly controlling precedent. In these
circumstances, deliberations among appellate judges are more
difficult and there is more room for discretion in the exercise of
appellate decisionmaking. Appellate cases are idiosyncratic; it is
therefore hard to generalize meaningfully about their susceptibility to
determinate resolution. Based on what I have seen during the course
of twenty-nine years on the bench, however, I have estimated that
approximately one-half of the cases decided by the courts of appeals
are “easy”; in other words, the pertinent legal rules seem
unambiguous and their application to the facts appears clear. A
dispute falling into this category, I believe, admits of only one “right
answer.” Were I to vote to decide an easy case in any other way, I
would expect to be accused of having made an error, not merely of
having voted or ruled unwisely. Again, using rough estimates, I have
estimated that in only 5 to 15 percent of the disputes that come before
me in any given term do I conclude, after reviewing the record and all
of the pertinent legal materials, that the competing arguments drawn
from those sources are equally strong. Put differently, only in those
few cases do I feel that fair application of the law to the facts leaves
me in equipoise and that to dispose of the appeal I must rely on some
significant measure of discretion. I view these cases as “very hard.”
That leaves roughly 35 percent to 45 percent of the cases per year that
are neither “easy” nor “very hard.” In appeals falling into this middle
category, each party is able to make at least one legal argument that I
find colorable, but, after research, reflection, and discussion, the
argument(s) advanced by one party seem to me demonstrably
stronger than the argument(s) advanced by the other. Under such
circumstances, I feel constrained to render judgment in favor of the
3
party who has made the more compelling claims.
A “hard” or “very hard” case often results in extended and weighty
deliberations between the judges who have been assigned to decide the
case. Judges often start with different “takes” on the correct

3. I first discussed these ideas in The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections
on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication. Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in
Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983–84). My general assessment of the breakdown of “easy,” “hard,”
and “very hard” cases heard by court of appeals judges has remained the same over my twentynine years on the bench. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1685 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards, Collegiality]; Harry T.
Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS.
L. REV. 837, 854.
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disposition. But, after careful analysis of the relevant legal materials,
thoughtful deliberations more often than not lead to a unanimous
judgment. Very few federal court of appeals decisions include a
dissent, which indicates that deliberations are productive. Thus, while
“hard” and “very hard” cases admit of a measure of judicial
discretion, that discretion is channeled through a deliberative process
that, in the vast majority of cases, leads to a consensus opinion as to
the best legal answer within the adversarial context.
Because it is undisputed that some cases admit of discretion in the
exercise of appellate decisionmaking, scholars and commentators
sometimes contend that judges must be influenced in their
decisionmaking by their personal political or ideological
predilections. This may happen at times. But any assessment of
appellate decisionmaking that fails to discriminate between forms of
moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those that are extrinsic
to law is flawed. It is well understood that legal reasoning involves
moral judgment (not in the form of personal whim or preference, but
rather in the situated and disciplined elaboration of the conventional
norms of the American political community) in cases in which judges
exercise delegated or common law–making authority. Therefore, the
mere assertion that judges are sometimes influenced by political or
ideological considerations in their decisionmaking is unilluminating.
Legal scholars remain interested in trying to use empirical
methods—most notably the statistical analysis of case outcomes—to
understand the effect of extralegal factors on appellate
decisionmaking. In our view, the principal problem with such
empirical legal analyses is that they cannot distinguish between legal
and extralegal factors without considering and accurately accounting
for the most important determinants of appellate decisionmaking: (1)
the case records on appeal, (2) the applicable law, (3) controlling
precedent, and (4) judicial deliberations. By failing to take account of
these core determinants—in part, perhaps, because they cannot be
easily or accurately measured—the field of empirical legal studies fails
to provide a nuanced understanding of how legal and extralegal
factors interact to generate judicial decisions, and likely
overemphasizes extralegal factors. These empirical legal analyses are
also flawed in their failure to take account of “unpublished” decisions
issued by the federal courts of appeals, which in 2007 constituted over
4
80 percent of the cases decided by the appellate courts. The omission
of unpublished decisions almost surely skews results in favor of
4. See infra note 69.
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finding greater influence from extralegal factors. It is noteworthy,
however, that even on their own limited terms, empirical studies
predict very little about the effects of extralegal factors on appellate
decisionmaking.
This Article is a modest attempt to survey the state of empirical
analysis of decisionmaking in the federal courts of appeals. In the
Introduction and Part I, we discuss some of the limitations of
empirical legal analysis and point out how a number of scholars, in
their efforts to understand appellate decisionnmaking, have focused
on the wrong factors. This may explain why empirical studies are not
able to predict much about appellate decisionmaking. In Part II, we
consider several studies that attempt to quantify the effects of politics
and ideology on appellate decisionmaking and highlight the limited
findings of these studies. Throughout the article (especially in Parts I
through III), we reject many of the broader conclusions of empirical
studies that have attempted to assess appellate decisionmaking. First,
we note that empirical work in this area suffers from several
important methodological limitations that render bold conclusions
highly suspect; second, we argue that without considering how judges
have applied the law and relied on controlling precedent, empirical
studies cannot meaningfully claim to understand the effects of politics
and ideology on appellate decisionmaking; and, finally, we contend
that, because appellate decisions are made by panels, rather than by
individuals acting alone, studies that fail to take account of judicial
deliberations are incomplete.
In Part III, we conclude that empirical studies predict very little, if
anything, about the effects of extralegal factors on appellate
decisionmaking. The hypothesis that judicial decisionmaking is
influenced by the ideology of judges only implicates extralegal factors
if and to the extent that any such ideological influence is extrinsic to
law. However, as we note, empirical studies fail to discriminate
between forms of moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those
extrinsic to law—in part because the measure of “ideology” is very
crude, and in part because the role of legal factors is not taken into
account. Most members of the legal profession—judges, lawyers, and
scholars—subscribe to a conception of law that encompasses, at least
in some circumstances, forms of moral or political reasoning. If one
accepts that such reasoning is legal reasoning, then any statistical
model that uses a measure of ideology that potentially captures
reasoning of this sort cannot tell us much about appellate
decisionmaking beyond the bland assertion that judicial disagreement
explains variation in outcomes. It cannot disprove the hypothesis that
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legitimate differences in legal reasoning, properly understood, are
responsible for the variation. Ideology may inappropriately affect
variation in legal outcomes only if (a) ideology or politics takes on an
impermissible, extralegal characteristic—something that empirical
scholarship has not shown—or (b) we are wrong in our view that
some political and ideological questions are intrinsic to law itself.
Thus, empirical scholars can convince us to accept their central claim
(that extralegal judicial “ideology” explains variation in some legal
outcomes) only if they first convince us that we are wrong in our view
that some political and ideological questions are intrinsic to law itself.
In other words, empirical ideologists must convince us that we should
adopt a formalistic or “hard” positivistic theory that insists that legal
questions never appropriately subsume moral or political questions.
But, of course, if empirical scholars could do this (assuming they
wanted to), they would not be showing that judges have been
substituting their ideology for law but, rather, that judges have been
following a conception of law that we should reject for normative
reasons. And, if they are right in this, their claim would be recognized
as a contribution to philosophical jurisprudence, not empirical legal
studies.
In Part IV, I offer some data from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, with an explanation of how the judges on my court
go about deciding cases. In doing so, I argue that my colleagues and I
are committed to applying the law and adhering to controlling
precedent, not giving vent to our personal political and ideological
leanings, and that we achieve this goal most of the time. As the data
show, an overwhelming majority of the decisions of the D.C. Circuit
are issued without a dissent. This is true in most circuits.
In Part V, we briefly explore some new studies that are being
conducted in an effort to understand the effects of cultural cognition
on judicial decisionmaking and consider whether such studies will
produce more nuanced and fruitful results than those that have
attempted to measure the effects of politics and ideology. We conclude
with a discussion of the importance of judicial deliberations and note
that, at least to date, it has been virtually impossible for empirical
scholars to meaningfully quantify this critical aspect of appellate
decisionmaking.
Finally, it is worth noting that, in writing this Article, we do not
mean to dispute the reality that presidents often seek to appoint judges
whose views are consistent with their own. Indeed, when a court is
composed of judges who come from a variety of professional and
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political backgrounds, this can make for better-informed
deliberations. Our principal point, however, is that it does not follow
from the political reality of partisan appointments that judges act in a
partisan way in deciding cases once on the bench. Rather, what we
believe is that, on an appellate court that adheres to collegial
principles, the applicable law, controlling precedent, and the collegial
deliberative process in appellate decisionmaking are the primary
determinants of case outcomes. Certainly, no study has shown
otherwise.
Harry T. Edwards
Senior Circuit Judge
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INTRODUCTION
The federal judiciary is a uniquely difficult object of scholarly
inquiry for those committed to empirical investigation. Two points
are worth stressing. First, “the close study of precedents and their
impact [on appellate decisionmaking] is impossible with currently
5
available or readily foreseeable empirical tools.” This is a serious
issue, because precedents “fix the point of departure from which the
6
labor of the judge begins.” Second, judicial decisionmaking takes
place in a closed environment and deliberating judges are bound by
propriety and ethics to maintain confidentiality. The outputs are clear
enough—judicial decisions that resolve disputes between litigants
before the court, determine the rights of parties, and construe and
apply the nation’s laws. At least some of the inputs—the judgment,
verdict, or order under review, the record before the appellate court,
the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, applicable statutory and
regulatory provisions, and precedent—are published as well. But the
deliberative process pursuant to which case inputs are transformed
into a judicial decision cannot be observed by outsiders; nor is there a
transcript of judges’ deliberations leading to a decision. As a result,
scholars and other interested parties have no access to the actual
process of appellate decisionmaking.
In recent years, there has been a greater effort on the part of
legal scholars to apply various empirical methodologies to the study
of judicial decisionmaking. Empirical researchers generally seek to
provide a clearer understanding of how judicial decisionmaking
works, rather than to prescribe how judges should make decisions.
Rather than reading and interpreting judicial opinions in light of
existing law—the mainstay of traditional legal analysis—these new
methodologies treat judicial decisions as raw data and then analyze
these data using statistical techniques. This “empirical legal analysis”
seeks to describe meaningful relationships between identified
variables to either prove or disprove particular hypotheses about
7
those relationships. Judicial decisions are treated largely as

5. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 202 (2007).
6. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 20.
7. In this Article, we use a restricted view of “empirical legal analysis.” For our purposes,
we are referring to the body of literature that applies social science techniques of data analysis
to legal opinions. Lee Epstein and Gary King, in a wide-ranging critique of empirical work in
the legal academy, provide a much more expansive definition. See Lee Epstein & Gary King,
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epiphenomenal responses to extralegal factors (such as “ideology”),
and the goal of empirical analysis is to measure the effects of these
factors.
There are many empirical studies devoted to the decisions of the
Supreme Court. However, because of the Court’s unique status and
operating procedures, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about
decisionmaking in the federal courts of appeals from studies of the
Supreme Court. The Court, which is seen by many to play a major
role in American political life, controls the evolution of federal
constitutional law, fixes constructions of disputed federal statutes and
regulations, gives content to federal common law, and has great
discretion in choosing which cases to hear and resolve. The Court
hears only a limited number of cases each year, and many of those
involve high profile, controversial, and difficult legal issues. In
contrast, the intermediate courts of appeals only occasionally deal
with very high profile issues. The courts of appeals also hear far more
cases each year than does the Supreme Court, have only very limited
control over their dockets, and normally sit in panels of three (not en
banc).
The federal courts of appeals are very important in their own
right, however. Each year they resolve thousands of cases, involving
many important questions of federal law from which no review is
taken. Because the courts of appeals have such a large role in the
development and enforcement of federal law, they have drawn the
attention of a number of legal scholars interested in using empirical
methods to understand judicial decisionmaking.
There have been some notable controversies over the accuracy
of empirical studies that have sought to measure the effects of
8
extralegal factors on decisionmaking in the courts of appeals.

The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002). Epstein and King invoke a broader
understanding of “[t]he word ‘empirical’ [to] denote[] evidence about the world based on
observation or experience. That evidence can be numerical (quantitative) or nonnumerical
(qualitative) . . . . What makes research empirical is that it is based on observations of the
world—in other words, data, which is just a term for facts about the world.” Id. at 2–3.
8. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2157
(1998); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV.
1335, 1336 (1998); Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1641; Epstein & King, supra note 7, at
2; William S. Jordon, III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons from
a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 45, 52 (2001); Richard L.
Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 188 (2002)
[hereinafter Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship]; Richard L. Revesz,
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However, these debates have tempered in recent years as some
empiricists have employed more sophisticated techniques,
acknowledged the limitations of their methodologies, and offered
more nuanced conclusions that confirm the limited power of current
methods to predict legal outcomes. Some scholars have even taken
steps to break from the constraining mind-set of “left-right” partisan
politics and have attempted to provide richer accounts of how
9
individual factors, such as cultural cognition, can influence judicial
decisionmaking. Perhaps most importantly, some empirical
researchers acknowledge the importance of precedent on judicial
10
decisionmaking; and concomitantly, a number of researchers now
11
give recognition to the role of law in appellate decisions.
Despite these recent improvements in empirical studies,
significant challenges remain. As noted above, in deciding cases,
appellate judges rely on legal materials and legal reasoning. Appellate
judges also deliberate with their colleagues before a decision can be
reached. Given how appellate judges routinely decide cases, it would
be very difficult to meaningfully assess decisionmaking in the courts
of appeals without considering the effects of legal materials on the
decisions reached by appellate panels. As currently structured,
empirical research also cannot discern whether judges’ political views
or ideology override the governing law. To make this assessment,
empiricists would first have to distinguish between forms of
moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those extrinsic to law.
Were an empirical study able to do this, it might then be possible to
assess how extralegal factors impermissibly influence judicial
interpretation of governing law. Until these questions are directly
investigated, however, attempts to understand appellate

Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1771 (1997)
[hereinafter Revesz, Environmental Regulation]; Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and
the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805, 851 (1999);
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About
Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 746 (2005); Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller
and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 239 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and
the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
873, 877 (2008) (book review).
9. Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” vs. “Cultural Cognition of” Law: What Difference Does it
Make? 1 (Harvard Law Sch. Program on Risk Regulation, Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111865. For a discussion of cultural cognition, see infra
Part V.
10. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 5, at 201–27.
11. See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 8, at 876.
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decisionmaking through empirical studies will remain something of a
peripheral undertaking.
Legal scholars understand that studying the effect of precedent
will be no mean feat:
More sophisticated statistical models that include legal factors and
legal reasoning as variables are perhaps the greatest priority in
continued quantitative examination of the federal judiciary. A fully
specified legal model will prove eternally elusive [however] because
legal reasoning is not formulaic in nature: the reasonable parameters
for debate on the determinate nature of text and doctrine cannot be
12
described by number.

The deliberative process, which cannot be directly studied,
further complicates empirical researchers’ attempts to consider the
effects of precedent on appellate decisionmaking. This is especially
true in “hard” and “very hard” cases in which the law may be unclear.
In these cases, the deliberative process takes on added importance.
Judges, working with the available legal materials, attempt to arrive
at a shared vision of the law, and a judge’s initial view may change
several times as it is tested and revised in the face of the competing
perspectives of his or her colleagues. During deliberations, the
differing views of three experienced lawyers are—more often than
not—forged into one. This process can be complex—cognitively,
sociologically, and psychologically. Empiricists, however, have no
access to these important confidential exchanges between appellate
judges during their deliberations over “hard” and “very hard“ cases.
As a result, when the court issues a unanimous decision in a hard or
very hard case, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a researcher to
determine whether and how any individual judge on the panel was
influenced by extralegal factors.
There are other important limitations in empirical legal studies.
These limitations include methodological challenges (including
questions about translating textual decisions into raw data), as well as
conceptual issues (including the validity of the attitudinal model of
judicial behavior discussed in Part I.B infra). A pervasive limitation is
the lack of a good proxy for judicial ideology, which has caused

12. Id. at 884.
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empirical legal scholars to dubiously equate the political party of the
13
president who appoints a judge with that judge’s “ideology.”
These limitations do not mean that empirical legal studies are
worthless. Properly done and interpreted, empirical legal studies
sometimes may illuminate our understanding of judicial behavior.
However, the limitations of empirical legal studies mean that
researchers must be “less expansive . . . in drawing conclusions from
14
their findings.”
I. LIMITATIONS IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES
A. Introduction
Most empirical legal analysis is, from a technical standpoint,
fairly straightforward. Independent variables are identified and
compared to an output variable. Where they exist, statistically
significant correlations are found. However, ascribing meaning to
those correlations is a much more difficult task. As Professor Cross
cautions: “[a] reader [of empirical studies] should not place undue
importance on a finding of statistical significance, because such a
finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not
prove the substantive significance of that correlation. One must also
15
consider the magnitude of the association.” Even where a strong
relationship is shown, the meaning of that relationship may still be
unclear. It has been argued that “the current state of empirical legal
scholarship is deeply flawed,” in part because “readers learn
considerably less accurate information about the empirical world than
the studies’ stridently stated, but overly confident, conclusions
16
suggest.” This harsh indictment may be somewhat overstated, but it
is not fanciful, and any serious claim that empirical legal studies are
13. Scholars in the field typically refer to variables relating to the appointment process of
judges, like the party of appointing president, as “ideology” or “ideological variables”—a
convention we reject. We instead refer to party of appointing president and other such measures
as “appointment variables.”
14. Sisk, supra note 8, at 886 n.72.
15. CROSS, supra note 5, at 4.
16. Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 6–7. But see Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal
Scholarship, supra note 8, at 188–89 (“[E]mpirical legal scholarship has a great deal to
contribute to the understanding of law and legal institutions, and social scientists would benefit
from paying close attention to the methodological innovations performed by legal scholars.
Because of their flawed methodology and unwarranted criticisms and exaggerations, Epstein
and King have missed an important opportunity to examine what legal and social science
empirical scholarship can learn from one another.”).
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flawed raises an extremely important concern, because most law
students and members of the legal profession are not trained in the
nuances and limits of empirical analysis. While empirical scholarship
can shed light on certain aspects of the judicial process, uninitiated
readers must understand where the light is shining and which areas
remain unilluminated. Some empirical scholars are very responsible
in reporting their findings and, thus, avoid overstating their
conclusions. But there is still room for improvement, especially given
the naïveté of many readers who are unfamiliar with the art of
empirical study and the meaning of statistical concepts.
In our view, there are two major problems with empirical legal
studies that aim to understand the effects of extralegal factors on
appellate decisionmaking. We will first highlight these problems and
then discuss them in a bit more detail in the subsections that follow
this introduction.
First, empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking are too often
17
informed by the “attitudinal model” of judicial behavior. This model
posits a stark difference between “legal” and “ideological” decisions,
and it is premised on the view that the law plays little role in
structuring judicial decisions. In other words, the attitudinal model
assumes that judicial decisions are determined principally by the
political preferences of judges.
[M]any social scientists—especially political scientists [and some
legal scholars following their lead]—believe that the “law” boils
down to outcomes, and that whatever rationales or justifications
judges invoke are mere smokescreens designed to hide the fact that
politics drives the result. Political scientists might ask, “Why bother
to study smokescreens when it is the outcome that matters to all the
18
relevant actors, including the judges?”

However, as any good lawyer knows, a “focus on outcome to the
19
exclusion of law can reach extremes that . . . are mind-boggling” and
is likely to lead to very poor predictive results.
17. For a description of the attitudinal model, see, for example, JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86–97
(2002).
18. Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt & Peter Wiedenbeck, Judging Statutes: Thoughts on
Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 305, 320 (2003).
19. Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the
Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 486–87 (2009). Professor Shapiro offers the following
example of a “mind-boggling” analysis:
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Unsurprisingly, the attitudinal model, which rests on a simplistic
liberal/conservative dichotomy, has been sharply criticized. As
Professor Shapiro argues,
In the attitudinal model’s starkest form, with its emphasis solely on
case outcomes, there is no difference, for example, between Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in the recent school desegregation case[, Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,] and
the plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts. Both
justices sided with the white plaintiffs in their equal protection
challenges to integration plans of the Seattle and Louisville school
districts. But the contents of those opinions are significantly
different. Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, explicitly
rejected the plurality’s “all-too-unyielding insistence that race
cannot [ever] be a factor” in school district decisions. Despite their
agreement on “outcome,” the opinions are not uniformly
“conservative.” And the differences between Kennedy and Roberts
20
are likely to be central to the real-world impact of the case.

Some contemporary empirical legal scholars have tried to
21
construct studies that limit the worst effects of the attitudinal model.
However, so long as empirical legal studies draw conclusions based
on binary liberal/conservative outcomes and follow the attitudinal
model in failing to account for the effects of law, precedent, and
deliberations on judicial decisionmaking, these studies will be
seriously wanting.
Second, there are several important methodological limitations
of empirical legal studies. Some methodological limitations—such as
[D]escribing the “apparently unidimensional nature of Supreme Court
decisionmaking,” two political scientists (including [Harold] Spaeth’s frequent
co-author Jeffrey Segal) assert in a 2005 article: “The vote on the merits in any given
case is as straightforward as a majority rule process gets. Justices essentially make a
binary, reverse or affirm decision.”
Id. at 486 n.41 (quoting Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and
Judicial Review, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2005)).
20. Id. at 486–87 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
21. For example, a major problem in many studies premised on the attitudinal model is
that overly simplistic proxies for “ideology,” such as the party of the president who appointed a
judge, are often used. Scholars in this area have attempted to develop more sophisticated
proxies. For example, Cross uses Giles scores to “assign[] relative levels of ideological
preferences to particular presidents and to the judges that those presidents appointed.” CROSS,
supra note 5, at 19. However, the use of Giles scores results in only a small, marginal
improvement over the party-of-the-appointing-president proxy. And naturally, this change does
not address the issue of the binary nature of outcomes in his or other studies.
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appropriate data samples—are general and apply to any kind of
empirical study. Others—such as difficulties that arise when scholars
attempt to translate the written language of judicial decisions into
data that are susceptible to mathematical analysis—are more specific
to the field. For studies that attempt to account for the effects of
ideology on decisionmaking, there is the recurring problem of
defining a measurable variable:
The available methods for measuring the ideology of judges and
decisions are rough and imperfect. Translating something so
amorphous as ideology into a numerical measure for quantitative
analysis will inevitably be imperfect. Moreover, rarely does one have
the same ideological perspective on all subjects. It is relatively
common for an individual to be liberal on some social issues and
conservative on economic issues, for example. In such a case, a
simple single-point measure will miss much of the individual’s
22
ideological preference pattern.

B. The Attitudinal Model and Its Role in Empirical Legal Analysis
1. Historical Context—Simplistic Assumptions about the Nature
of Law. The empirical study of legal decisions is not new, and
contemporary scholarship has been deeply influenced by early work
in the field. As early as the 1920s, political scientists were using basic
empirical analyses to support the newly prominent legal realists’
perspective on judicial decisionmaking. In an article published in the
Illinois Law Review in 1922, political scientist Charles Grove Haines
called for greater scrutiny of extralegal factors in judicial
decisionmaking:
[L]egal logic, tradition and precedent, has received extended and
adequate treatment at the hands of lawyers and political
scientists . . . [while] the element of free conception, in which
individual views and personal notions have influenced and have
frequently predetermined judicial decisions, has received scant
23
attention.

Haines used an early attempt at empirical analysis to support his
claim that “individual views and personal notions” influence judicial

22. Id. at 20.
23. Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and
Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REV. 96, 114 (1922).
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decisions. Looking to the records of the New York City magistrate
courts, Haines found significant variations between individual judges:
In 1916, 17,075 persons were charged before the magistrates with
intoxication. Of these, 92 per cent were convicted. But . . . one judge
discharged 79 per cent of this class of cases. In cases for disorderly
conduct one judge heard 566 cases and discharged one person,
24
whereas another judge discharged 18 per cent; another 54 per cent.

From these data Haines found that “the magistrates differed to
25
an amazing degree in their treatment of similar classes of cases.”
Haines thus concluded that it “was inescapable that justice is a
personal thing, reflecting the temperament, the personality, the
26
education, environment, and personal traits of the magistrates.”
Haines’ article strikingly foreshadows the development of
empirical study of judicial decisionmaking. A recent characterization
of Haines’ pieces notes “its incipient quantitative analysis” as well as
27
its “nascent attitudinalism.” The second characteristic is important
because it describes a methodological perspective that has come to
dominate empirical analysis of judicial decisionmaking. As noted
above, the attitudinal model holds that judges decide cases on the
basis of their personal policy preferences; the role of law in
28
structuring judicial decisions is assumed to be minimal. As described
by Glendon Schubert—an early innovator in the application of
empirical techniques to the study of judicial decisions—the attitudinal
model assumes that jurists have “relatively well-structured attitudes
toward the recurrent major issues of public policy that confront the
29
[Supreme] Court for decision.” According to this model, the
opinions of the Court can best be understood as reflecting the
attitudes of the Justices. As Schubert put it:
24. Id. at 105 (citing George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 90, 98 (1919)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science,
in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 8 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2005).
28. See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
134–57 (1976); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 17, at 86; Harold J. Spaeth, The
Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296, 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); Frank B.
Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary
Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–79 (1997).
29. GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946–1963, at 37 (1965).
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[G]iven a particular structure of attitudinal relationships among the
justices, and a set of cases raising questions that correspond to
degrees
of
valuation
along
[those
same] . . . attitudinal
dimensions . . . it is then possible to specify (in theory) how each
30
justice voted in each case . . . .

Schubert thus argued that cases before the Court present “complex
stimuli, which (in effect) ask questions about issues to which the
31
justices are asked to respond.”
An influential gloss on the attitudinal model posits that judges do
not always vote their preferences, because they may sometimes act
strategically to maximize their preferences in the long run by voting
against their preferences in a particular case. Under this model,
judges exist within an institutional context with “structural constraints
that, in a collegial decision-making environment, operate to make
judicial choices about voting or opinion writing interdependent and a
32
function of the actors’ strategy for maximizing policy preferences.”
This strategic model is fundamentally congruent with earlier
attitudinal models in that both assume a set of policy preferences in
the mind of the judge that are stable over time and control the judge’s
decisionmaking. Whether simply “voting” according to attitudes, or
acting strategically to maximize preferences, judges’ views on cases
are assumed to be determined by fixed, predetermined views.
Since the 1960s, the attitudinal model has been “the major
33
approach guiding research into judicial decision making.” For those
interested in pursuing empirical study of judicial decisionmaking, the
34
attitudinal model has the advantage of “parsimonious explanation.”
The model reduces the number of variables under study to a bare
minimum and thus holds out the promise of an easy formula for the
assessment of judicial decisionmaking. However, because the
attitudinal model trivializes the significance of “law” and fails to
account for judicial deliberations—matters that are indispensable
aspects of an appellate judge’s work—the attitudinal model is at best
35
a specious account of appellate decisionmaking.
30. Id. at 42.
31. Id. at 37.
32. Maveety, supra note 27, at 25–26.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id.
35. See Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old
Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 15, 27 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing how
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The attitudinal model continues to influence the studies
undertaken by contemporary legal empirical scholars. Just as Haines
used rudimentary empirical analysis to test his theory of legal
36
realism, contemporary scholars (either explicitly or implicitly) use
empirical analysis to test versions of the attitudinal model. As
described by Cross: “Judicial politics or ideology is commonly
juxtaposed with decision making according to law. . . . Whether the
judge is deciding [cases] according to the better legal arguments or to
his or her ideology is the question. Quantitative empirical research is
37
suited to help answer this question.”
The attitudinal model thus structures the hypotheses that many
empirical studies set out to test. In Haines’s early empirical work, the
null hypothesis was that the law fully determines outcomes and that
38
judges decide all cases according to law. This null hypothesis was
falsified on the basis of data showing different judges who seemed to
39
be treating the same types of cases in different ways. Therefore, the
thinking goes, we should reject the null hypothesis in favor of the
alternative—that judges’ personal preferences determine legal
outcomes. Recent empirical studies, while clearly more sophisticated
than Haines’s study, rely on a similar model whose premise is that
either law determines case outcomes, or judicial decisionmaking is
impermissibly dominated by ideology and politics.
2. Criticisms of the Attitudinal Model. The attitudinal model has
been a consistent target for attack, and for good reasons: it does not
adequately account for the role of law and precedent in judicial

attitudinalists simply assume that judges “vote their policy preferences and use legal principles
to mask their true motives”).
36. Haines referred to legal realists’ ideas as a conception of “free legal decision.” Haines,
supra note 23, at 96–102.
37. CROSS, supra note 5, at 12, 14.
38. Haines’s research agenda was deeply influenced by his views concerning how judges
make decisions. Haines contrasted two theories of decisionmaking, which he termed the
“mechanical theory” and the “theory of free legal decision.” Haines, supra note 23, at 96–102.
The mechanical theory—which today we might refer to as legal formalism—”postulates
absolute legal principles, existing prior to and independent of all judicial decisions, and merely
discovered and applied by courts.” Id. at 97. The theory of free legal decision, which Haines
embraced, postulated “that judicial decisions are affected by the judge’s views of public policy
and by the personality of the particular judge rendering the decision.” Id. at 102. Haines’s
theory of free legal decision was deeply influenced by legal realists of his time—Justice Holmes
and other legal realists are quoted extensively by Haines to support his views of how judges
make decisions.
39. Id. at 105.
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decisionmaking, it indulges fanciful assumptions about the nature of
judicial preferences, it fails to account for judicial deliberations, and it
has an impoverished account of ideology and law.
a. Failure to Adequately Account for the Role of Law. From its
inception, the attitudinal model has been criticized for misstating the
role of law and precedent in judicial decisions, and for largely
ignoring judicial deliberations. For example, shortly after publication
of Glendon A. Schubert’s The Judicial Mind: the Attitudes and
40
Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946–1963 —a seminal work in
41
the development of the attitudinal model —a reviewer criticized
Schubert for “evad[ing]” questions such as whether “the legal
argument” before the Court might be “so powerful or appealing that
one’s position on the liberalism-conservatism pragmatism-dogmatism
42
scale would have little or no effect.”
The attitudinal model is similar to legal realism and critical legal
studies in that all, to some extent, posit that “legal decisionmaking is
substantially congruent with decisionmaking simpliciter, and . . . legal
justification, which attempts to make legal decisionmaking look more
different from nonlegal decisionmaking than it in fact is, is best seen
43
as a form of stylized and post hoc rationalization.” Judge Posner has
44
forwarded a similar view in his theory of “pragmatic adjudication.”
While Judge Posner acknowledges that judges are bound by the law
when statutes and precedent dispose of the precise question on
appeal, he also believes that a large percentage of the issues decided
by the appellate courts do not so precisely fall within the confines of
existing law. Instead, according to Judge Posner, it is the
responsibility of judges to “come up with the decision that will be best

40. SCHUBERT, supra note 29.
41. Maveety, supra note 27, at 14.
42. Anthony D. Castberg, Book Review, 19 W. POL. Q. 583, 585 (1966) (reviewing
SCHUBERT, supra note 29); see also Joseph Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial
Decisions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (1966) (“[T]he application of Schubert’s rules can lead
to odd results.”).
43. Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1096–97 (1997).
44. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20 (1996). Judge
Posner rejects the attitudinal model as an overly simplistic model of judicial behavior. Richard
A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2006)
[hereinafter Posner, The Role of the Judge]. However, the model that he and Landes use in their
empirical analysis, discussed in Part II.C, has features that appear to be quite similar to the
attitudinal model.
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45

with regard to present and future needs.” The theories underlying
the attitudinal model, legal realism, critical legal studies, and
pragmatic adjudication share the view that the law generally does not
constrain judges in their decisionmaking because it does not provide
clear answers.
“Legal formalism”—which posits that “law” is a determinate set
of rules distinct from political and social factors—often serves as a foil
for the legal realist and critical legal studies positions (and, by
extension, the attitudinal model). But the truth of the matter is that
legal formalism, at least in its most rigid formulation, has not been
broadly embraced by the judiciary for many decades, if ever. In an
interesting and illuminating study, Professor Brian Tamanaha
demonstrates that judges historically have eschewed legal formalism
and have been quite self-aware of the limits of the law and of their
own capacities to enforce it:
Judges as a group have been neither deluded nor duplicitous about
what is involved in the process of judging. It is time to get over this
dismissive notion and pay attention to what they are saying, for they
offer a font of reliable information about what is involved in judging.
Judges have acknowledged the openness of law and their frailty as
humans, but steadfastly maintain that this reality does not prevent
them from carrying out their charge to make decisions in accordance
46
with the law to the best of their ability.

The point is that even if law draws on interdisciplinary sources in
judicial decisionmaking, judicial decisionmaking can still retain
autonomy from illicit extralegal forces.
We think it is fair to say that most appellate judges, while they
would acknowledge that the law is unclear in some cases, believe that
the vast majority of cases in the circuit courts admit of a right or a
47
best answer and do not require the exercise of unbridled discretion.

45. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 242
(1999).
46. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 13–14), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024747.
47. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1644; see also Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of
Judicial Decision Making, Address at the Symposium on the California Judiciary, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles (Mar. 19, 1993), in 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 994 (1993) (“The larger
reality . . . is that judges exercise their powers subject to very significant constraints.”); Wald,
supra note 8, at 237 (“At this point I must reveal [the D.C. Circuit’s] ‘dirty little secret’: A large
portion of our cases (particularly administrative law cases) have no apparent ideology to
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Moreover, as their published opinions show, most judges reach this
conclusion without relying on strong formalist claims about what the
law dictates. In other words, while these judges acknowledge that the
law has sources of potential indeterminacy, they believe that in most
instances one legal argument will have greater plausibility within the
legal community than the others pressed by the litigants. As
experienced members of the legal community, judges recognize which
arguments are fundamentally more plausible and decide cases
accordingly. Deciding cases according to law and precedent, rather
than personal political or ideological predilections, does not require
judges to embrace the simpler and less defensible view that law
absolutely dictates outcomes. Nor does it cause judges to deny that
moral and political values can at times influence how they read the
law. This certainly is the case when political or ideological questions
are intrinsic to the law itself. It does mean that, according to norms of
professional responsibility and integrity, judges are required to apply
the law neutrally and to follow precedent as they read it, irrespective
48
of how they might prefer a case to come out. These norms are
sufficiently strong—and the law sufficiently clear—that most of the
time judges are capable of setting aside idiosyncratic readings of the
law for the one most likely to be embraced by the legal community.
b. Questionable Assumptions about Judicial Views and
Preferences, and the Failure to Account for Judicial Deliberations.
The attitudinal model also makes strong—and highly contestable—
assumptions about the nature of judicial views and preferences.
Possibly the most obviously questionable assumption underlying the
attitudinal model is that an individual judge’s personal views are
immutable and easily characterized pursuant to a two-dimensional
left-right axis. For most judges, these are absurd notions—there is no
reason to think that judges’ preferences are particularly stable, and
few judges can be easily pigeonholed as consistently “conservative”
or “liberal” on all issues.
Furthermore, adherents of the attitudinal model fail to
comprehend the importance of assessing judges’ work in the context
of the judiciary’s institutional norms:

support or reject at all—the judges are tasked simply with plowing through volumes of complex
data and reams of statistical evidence to see if the agency has substantial evidence to back its
findings or has acted in an arbitrary and capricious way.”).
48. See Kozinski, supra note 47, at 995; Sisk & Heise, supra note 8, at 793–94.
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Individuals who are associated with particular institutions often
come to believe that their position imposes upon them an obligation
to act in accordance with particular expectations and
responsibilities. In other words, institutions not only structure one’s
ability to act on a set of beliefs; they are also a source of distinctive
political purposes, goals, and preferences. In fact, it is tempting to
argue that what makes something a recognizable “institution” is not
the hard reality of a building but instead some discrete and
discernible habits of thought, including a set of attitudes about the
appropriate functions to be performed by people associated with the
49
institution . . . .

Judges, in their professional roles, differ from other governmental
actors. The judiciary demands that its members neutrally interpret
and apply the law and follow precedent. There is a process of
socialization and acculturation during which new judges join the
judiciary’s culture in which respect for law is accorded a high value.
To be sure, there can be no guarantee that a particular judge will be
affected by group norms of judicial restraint, but few question that
this process, by and large, produces judges of integrity who have a felt
obligation to follow the law, adhere to precedent, and faithfully
engage in judicial deliberations that determine case outcomes based
on the applicable law and controlling precedent. These obligations
help mute whatever policy preferences a particular judge may bring
to the bench, and facilitate neutral interpretation.
The attitudinal model also fails to take into account deliberation
between judges. The model focuses on the views of individual judges;
however, appellate judicial decisions are rendered by three-judge
panels. The effects of collegiality and interjudge deliberations are not
50
accounted for in the attitudinal model of judging. Collegial relations
among judges explicitly embrace the possibility that a judge’s view
regarding the correct case outcome under the law changes through
the course of deliberations. If, as judges report, judicial views about
the correct outcome of a case may change during the course of

49. Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra
note 35, at 1, 4–5.
50. See Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1656–57; Deanell Reece Tacha, The “C”
Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585, 586 (1995) (“I urge that we go beyond the matrix of
computerized decisionmaking to consider the qualitative aspects of judicial interaction . . . .”);
Wald, supra note 8, at 255 (noting that the “formal labeling of judges” by political party “is the
antithesis of collegial decisionmaking”).
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51

deliberations, then the attitudinal model ignores a crucial part of
judicial decisionmaking.
A related criticism of the attitudinal model is that it is not an
observation about how judges behave so much as a theory of judicial
behavior. For example, the so-called “strategic” gloss on the
attitudinal model assumes that judges have stable preferences on all
issues, and then posits that they sometimes suppress these preferences
in the short term to achieve long-term objectives. This gloss aims to
account for so-called “panel effects,” i.e., empirical studies showing
variables for some judges that appear to have predictive value for all
judges on a panel. Many appellate judges would laugh at the
suggestion that they are participants in such a long-term strategic
game, in part because judges often cannot remember many of the
cases that they decided in years past and so could not possibly
implement “strategies” to gain payback in future cases.
The strategic gloss on the attitudinal model may simplify
empirical analysis, but it does not fully and accurately portray how
judges routinely perform their work or interact with their colleagues.
There are more straightforward and compelling ways to theorize
about the data supporting the strategic model:
Where theorists of the strategic model might see a judge sacrificing
his or her principles or convictions to respond to colleagues’
pressure, [the alternative is to] see a judge who is open and
responsive to colleagues’ arguments, criticisms, and insights, with
the result being the thoughtful and efficient development of a
52
judicial outcome through the deliberative process.

c. Failure to Meaningfully Define and Measure “Ideology.” In part
because of the focus of the attitudinal model on judicial preferences—
largely eschewing the effects of law and precedent, and ignoring the
impact of judicial deliberations—legal empiricists have expended
significant efforts in attempting to measure the effect of judicial
51. See Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1648–52. For a compilation of additional
sources discussing the influence of collegiality on decisionmaking, see id. at 1641 n.10.
52. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1661; see also Richard L. Revesz, Congressional
Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in
the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1112 (2001) (stating that “panel effects” can be
explained by either a “deliberation hypothesis,” pursuant to which judges modify their views
because they take seriously the views of their colleagues, or a “dissent hypothesis,” under which
a judge who sits with two colleagues from a different political party moderates his or her views
in order to avoid having to write a dissent).
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“ideology” on decisionmaking. Because ideology is difficult (if not
impossible) to measure directly, scholars have generally used proxies
for ideology. Typical proxies include some variable associated with
the appointment process of a particular judge, the most common
53
being the party of appointing president. In other words, it is assumed
that judges appointed by Republican presidents are “conservative”
and judges appointed by Democratic presidents are “liberal.”
Unsurprisingly, the meanings of conservative and liberal are
invariably elusive.
This party-of-appointing-president (“PAP”) proxy measure has
come under criticism. As an initial matter, it is not the case that “all
Republican presidents are conservatives and all Democratic
54
presidents are liberal.” Further, presidents are not solely “motivated
55
to appoint judges who reflect their ideologies.” Commentators have
noted alternative motivations for presidents’ judicial choices other
56
than ideology, such as personal relationships or party building. More
sophisticated attempts to capture judicial ideology (such as the Giles
57
scores used by Cross and discussed more fully below ) only
marginally improve on the use of PAP as a proxy for ideology.
Alternative interpretations of correlations between appointment
variables and case outcome are possible. William Landes and Judge
Richard Posner argue that
[i]f the question, for example, is whether Democratic Presidents
appoint more liberal judges than Republican Presidents do, the
classification of the votes supplies the answer: If judges appointed by
Democratic Presidents vote more often for liberal outcomes than
judges appointed by Republican Presidents, it doesn’t matter

53. Alternative approaches have been proposed, but have not yet been widely adopted by
the empirical legal community. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial
Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 3–4), available at http://works.bepress.com/david_law/14 (suggesting that
empiricists have failed meaningfully to define “ideology” for purposes of assessing appellate
decisionmaking and proposing a new methodology for characterizing judges’ votes based on
past voting behavior).
54. Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 88.
55. Id. at 89.
56. Id. at 89 n.280.
57. See infra notes 149–66 and accompanying text.
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whether a particular judge, when appointed, would have been
58
considered liberal.

However, such a study would be limited by many of the same
methodological issues faced by other empirical analyses, and it would
not address the extent to which appellate decisionmaking is
influenced by extralegal factors, rather than by the law, precedent,
59
and judicial deliberations. Ideology is a complex idea that has never,
to our knowledge, been convincingly captured in any empirical legal
analysis. Judge Posner argues that we should distinguish between a
judge’s presumed political party affiliation, which he finds largely
insignificant in assessing the effect of extralegal factors on appellate
decisionmaking, and a judge’s “ideology”:
The question is what determines the judge’s discretionary judgment.
....
. . . “Politics” is not quite right, because it implies
partisanship . . . . [M]ost of our judges do not identify with a political
party . . . . “Ideology” is better. “Ideology” is a body of more or less
coherent bedrock beliefs about social, economic, and political
questions, or, more precisely perhaps, a worldview that shapes one’s
answers to those questions. Our principal political parties are
coalitions and so lack coherent ideologies. A judge may lean more
toward the set of policies associated with the Democratic Party or
more toward the set associated with the Republican Party, but
neither party is ideologically consistent; that is why party affiliation
has only limited value in predicting judicial decisions even in the
60
open area.

Judge Posner conjectures that the principal “sources of judges’
61
ideologies” are “moral and religious values.” He then argues that
these values

58. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study
3 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1126403.
59. As discussed in Part I, that the party of the president and Senate at the time of a judge’s
confirmation correlates with some measure of case outcomes does not confirm that extralegal
factors are in fact determining those outcomes. Debates and differences of perspective fully
within the law could equally account for such differences.
60. Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1058–59.
61. Id. at 1060.
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are a product of upbringing, education, salient life experiences, and
personal characteristics (which may determine those experiences)
such as race, sex, and ethnicity; and also of temperament, which
shapes not only values but also dispositions, such as timidity and
boldness, that influence a judge’s response to cases. At bottom, then,
the sources of ideology are both cognitive and psychological, but I
think the psychological dominates, because psychology exerts such a
great influence on our interpretation of our experiences, including
the weights assigned to the possible consequences of deciding a case
62
one way or the other.

In addition, a richer and more accurate account would acknowledge
that ideology is unlikely to remain fixed after early childhood, but
would continue to respond to experience and evolve over the course
of a person’s lifetime.
No empirical study of which we are aware accurately measures
the relationship between ideology, either in Judge Posner’s terms or
another equally nuanced view, and case outcomes. As Professor Sisk
has noted,
[W]e should be far from satisfied with the concept of ideology as
presently applied in empirical work regarding the courts. The
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines ideology as
“one variant form of those comprehensive patterns of cognitive and
moral beliefs about man, society, and the universe in relation to man
and society, which flourish in human societies.” Nothing nearly so
sophisticated is in operation in most empirical research conducted
on the courts, whether undertaken by political scientists or law
63
professors.

Nor is this problem amenable to easy solutions:
[R]efinement of the statistical measurement of ideology [does not]
appear likely to revolutionize the empirical research process in a
manner that will permit more confident conclusions. The empirical
evidence cannot justify elevating the assumed ideological or partisan
affiliations of judges above such traditional measures of judicial
temperament as legal experience, quality of legal reasoning, respect
64
for other actors in the legal process, and integrity.

62. Id. (footnote omitted).
63. Sisk, supra note 8, at 892 (footnote omitted).
64. Sisk & Heise, supra note 8, at 794.
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In the final analysis, it is dangerous to assume that appointment
variables are a useful proxy for ideology. While appointment
variables may be easily identified, the link between those measures
and some concept of “ideology” is contestable. When researchers
attempt to link an appointment variable with ideology, they weaken,
rather than strengthen, the quality of their analyses. Instead of
theorizing about a correlation that they can show—PAP and case
outcome, for example—they assume an identity between ideology
and PAP and then conclude that they have shown a correlation
between “ideology” and outcome. This connection is murky at best.
Researchers are on much safer ground theorizing about the reasons
for any perceived connection between PAP and outcome rather than
assuming the connection between PAP and ideology, and then
claiming to have shown a connection between ideology and outcome.
C. Methodological Problems Inherent in Empirical Studies That Seek
to Understand Judicial Decisionmaking
Empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking face several
important methodological hurdles as well. Before statistical
techniques can be applied, the inputs and outputs of the judicial
process must be translated into mathematical terms. This process
must be carefully structured to avoid introducing errors in the
analysis; and conclusions that are drawn necessarily must be
circumscribed to acknowledge the simplifications inherent in coding.
As with any other statistical analysis, close attention must be paid to
the selection of data and the relationships between variables under
study. While all of the difficulties of traditional data analysis are
present, a host of additional problems arise when judicial
decisionmaking—a fundamentally textual (and contextual)
enterprise—is reduced to statistical information.
1. Problems with the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Used by
Empiricists—Coding Errors and the Total Omission of Unpublished
Decisions. Many empiricists rely on the “U.S. Courts of Appeals
Database,” sometimes called the “Songer database” to provide the
65
raw data for their analyses. The database, which codes a random

65. See
The
Judicial
Research
Initiative,
Appeals
Court
Data,
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). The database was
originally compiled by Donald R. Songer and then updated by Ashlyn K. Kuersten and Susan B.
Haire.
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sample of published court of appeals decisions issued since 1925, was
“designed to create an extensive dataset to facilitate the empirical
analysis of the votes of judges and the decisions of the U.S. Courts of
66
Appeals.” Although the database is routinely used by empirical legal
scholars, it has at least two serious flaws.
First, as Landes and Posner discovered, the Songer database has
significant coding mistakes that can distort the accuracy of dependent
67
variables in empirical studies. These mistakes are explained in the
next section. Second, the Songer database does not include
68
unpublished decisions issued by the courts of appeals. This is an
extremely important omission, because a huge percentage of courts of
appeals decisions are reported but unpublished. In fact, in 2007, less
than 17 percent of all opinions in the courts of appeals were
69
published. Published decisions as a sample of total decisions are far
from random: the judgments rendered in unpublished decisions are
largely unanimous, and these cases typically involve more
straightforward applications of law. Unpublished decisions, no less
than published decisions, dispose of appeals on the merits.
Importantly, unpublished decisions offer valuable information
regarding a court’s adherence to precedent, because in these cases the
law is often most clear. Law professors and researchers tend to focus
on published decisions that raise difficult issues and establish new
precedent. For the vast majority of litigants, however, it is often of no
moment whether a case is published or not. The court’s judgment is
what matters. And every judgment counts when one attempts to
accurately measure the work of the appellate courts. Therefore, any
assessment of the work of the courts of appeals that does not include
unpublished decisions cannot be seen as complete.

66. Id.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 74–77.
68. DONALD R. SONGER, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DATA BASE
DOCUMENTATION FOR PHASE 1, at 8 (n.d.), available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/
cta_codebook.pdf. See generally Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and
State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 349, 351–57 tbl.1 (2004) (setting forth publication standards in different circuits).
69. 57,973 appeals were filed in the courts of appeals for the year ending December 31,
2007. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY tbl.B (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec07. During this same
period, courts of appeals terminated 31,340 cases on the merits. Id. at tbl.B-5. Less than 17
percent of those dispositions were published. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 48 tbl.S-3 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2007/ JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
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2. Problems with Dependent Variables—Trying to Code Judicial
Decisions. Empirical studies of judicial decisions look at “dependent”
and “independent“ variables. Dependent variables concern the object
under study, while the independent variables are those that are
hypothesized to affect the dependent variable. In studies of judicial
decisionmaking, the dependent variables relate to judicial opinions.
Typically, the component of a judicial opinion that has been treated
as a dependant variable is the case “outcome.”
Coding the outcome of a case involves significant difficulties.
Scholars have noted that there are many possible dispositions of cases
decided by the appellate courts:
• stay, petition, or motion granted
• affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
• reversed (including reversed and vacated)
• reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
• vacated and remanded (also set aside and remanded; modified
and remanded)
• affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed
and modified)
• affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded
• vacated
• petition denied or appeal dismissed
70
• certification to another court
Empirical studies routinely collapse the dispositions into a simple
binary outcome—such as “appellant prevails” or “appellee prevails.”
Reducing complex case outcomes to a binary variable may lead to
repeatability problems and create a significant source of potential
71
coding errors.
Some studies seek to code case outcome according to topical or
political criteria. For example, in an empirical study done by Glendon
Schubert, Supreme Court decisions issued between 1946 and 1963
were coded along two axes—political liberal/conservative and

70. Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 85 tbl.5 (citing The Judicial Research Initiative, supra
note 65).
71. Id. (noting that a researcher seeking to replicate or update a study based on a binary
coding system for case outcome will have to make “judgment call[s], which may or may not be
the same one[s] [the author] made. . . . [thereby] detract[ing] from the reliability of [the]
measure”).
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economic liberal/conservative. Cases also have been coded as pro/antienvironment, pro-/anticriminal defendant, pro/anti-civil rights,
and so on. Perhaps the most common metric used in empirical studies
73
is a simple “left/right” or “liberal/conservative” binary. These topical
or political measures used to describe cases will necessarily simplify a
court’s holding and reduce what may be a complex and nuanced
decision into an often uninformative binary.
When decisions are coded as liberal or conservative, every issue
resolved by the court in a single case must be collapsed into a single
determination of whether the outcome falls on the left or right side of
the binary. In other words, case outcomes normally are not measured
to give a complete reflection of the outcome in political terms. In an
administrative law case, for example, the court’s disposition might
include a judgment on standing that appears to be “conservative,” a
judgment on “arbitrary and capricious” review that appears to be
“liberal,” and a judgment under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
74
Resources Defense Council, Inc. review that is neither—this nuance
is lost in a binary outcome characterization.
In this same vein, it is very difficult to characterize many case
outcomes. For example, the general rights embraced by freedom of
religion and freedom of expression sometimes conflict with the
exercise of other rights; it may not be clear how presumed liberal or
conservative judges should be expected to vote in such cases. Cases
may be disposed of on procedural grounds that are essentially
nonideological, leading to coding errors when the outcome must be
coded as liberal or conservative. A court’s interpretation of a statute
may defy ideological description (e.g., rate allocations in a matter
before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, where the parties
before the court are competing companies). Even a cursory review of
some of the cases listed in Appendix B, infra, shows that many
appeals involve multiple, complex issues, thus making it impossible to
describe the appellate court’s disposition as liberal or conservative.
Finally, coding normally does not take into account the role of the

72. SCHUBERT, supra note 29, at 97.
73. See, e.g., Songer, supra note 68, at 5–6 (“[In the Songer database], the directionality of
the court’s decision was recorded, using conventional definitions of directionality that are
closely analogous to those in the Spaeth Supreme Court data base [sic]. For most, but not all
issue categories, these will correspond to notions of ‘liberal’ (coded as ‘3’) and ‘conservative’
(coded as ‘1’) that are commonly used in the public law literature.”).
74. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

EDWARDS IN FINAL.DOC

1926

5/25/2009 4:05:32 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1895

record on appeal, whether certain issues have been forfeited or
waived, the role of precedent, or the effect of judicial deliberations.
That coding is an imperfect enterprise is strikingly revealed in
Landes and Posner’s efforts to correct the Songer courts of appeals
database that has been used by many empirical legal scholars. In a
“spot check of 40 cases” from the database, Landes and Posner found
75
“a high error rate in cases decided before 1960.” They also found “a
number of the systematic classification decisions that the coders made
[which were] erroneous, such as classifying all votes for plaintiffs in
76
intellectual-property cases as liberal.” While Landes and Posner
attempted to eliminate the systematic coding errors, no attempt was
77
made to “correct the misclassification of individual cases.” While
this evidence is anecdotal, it shows that errors exist, and furthermore
shows that classification decisions are not uncontroversial. In addition
to simple mistakes—where data are incorrectly inputted—there can
be disagreement about where certain kinds of decisions fall on the
political spectrum. These “classification errors” will not only
introduce random “noise” into the data, but can systematically skew
78
the data and create the possibility of false correlations.
A final, and perhaps the most troubling, problem with coding
decisions—and one well recognized by many scholars who undertake
empirical legal scholarship—is that only the outcomes of decisions are
coded, not the content. A disposition on procedural grounds against
an environmental group is treated exactly the same as a decision on
the merits, although the consequences can be quite different.
Opinions that reach broad conclusions of law and include significant
dicta are treated the same as opinions that decide cases narrowly on
only the arguments presented. Whether an opinion hews closely to
precedent, or decides a case on first principles, is usually ignored.
Coding only for outcome eliminates large amounts of data and treats,
79
as identical, opinions that are, in many ways, quite different.
A related problem is that empirical studies tend to reduce
judicial decisionmaking to the private goal of dispute resolution in
individual cases. But judicial decisionmaking also serves public

75. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Shapiro, supra note 19, at 481–82 (providing in-depth analysis of coding problems
in a widely used database of Supreme Court cases).
79. For an example of an attempt to add legal issues to the coding process, see id.
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goals—indeed, that is why it is a public good—of elaborating, creating
and changing legal norms, of providing guidance to institutional
actors both within and outside the courts, and of establishing
80
democratic habits of trust and civility. Writers within the field of law
and economics certainly acknowledge these public dimensions,
focusing on such matters as incentives, transparency, and
81
accountability. Measures of case outcome, however, do not
incorporate these multiple purposes, instead reducing judicial
decisionmaking to a single datum based on whichever litigant
82
prevailed. Empiricists who rely solely on case outcomes thus equate
a part of judicial decisionmaking with the entirety of the enterprise.
Some empirical legal scholars understand that their research
must “move beyond asking which litigant prevailed in a case and now
also ask how the advocates and the court framed the question
83
presented and how the legal analysis unfolded in the opinion.” Law
professors should be well positioned to develop methods for
84
systematically analyzing opinions. But significant difficulties would
no doubt arise if legal academics made a serious effort to “transform
classic interpretive skills into recognizable and transferable social
85
science knowledge.”
3. Problems with Independent Variables—The Problematic
Absence of Data on Case Records, Applicable Law, Governing
Precedent, and Judicial Deliberations. In empirical studies of judicial
decisionmaking, certain independent variables that have been
studied—such as demographic information about the judges (e.g.,
age, race, and gender)—are published and clear. Likewise, certain
80. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); Kenneth E.
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938 (1975).
81. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW passim (7th ed. 2007).
82. Cass Sunstein has written extensively on “judicial minimalism,” the theory that courts
should address only the case at hand, hew closely to precedent, and avoid overly disruptive
changes in the law. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHTWING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 27–30 (2005). The simple measure of case outcome
fails to distinguish between a minimalist and its opposite—clearly a distinction that Sunstein
would find important.
83. Sisk, supra note 8, at 885.
84. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008).
85. Id. at 121. Unlike more traditional subjects of statistical study—like physical
phenomena—”many of the civil justice phenomena that need study are not [well] suited to
current quantitative analytic techniques.” Deborah R. Hensler, Researching Civil Justice:
Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 63 (Summer 1988).
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data emanating from outside the courtroom, like the political party in
control of Congress at the time of decision, can also be conclusively
established. Characteristics of the president and Congress at the time
of a judge’s nomination and appointment are also known, and can be
easily coded as an independent variable.
However, the most important variables for appellate
decisionmaking—the record before the court, the applicable law,
governing precedent, and judicial deliberations—pose very large
coding difficulties, and have gone largely unstudied as a result. For
example, the task of truly “coding” precedent would be enormous.
Formalized and repeatable procedures would have to be developed
for identifying the legal issues present in a case, determining the
scope of authoritative and persuasive law, and characterizing the
effect of that law on the outcome of the case. This process—the heart
of legal reasoning—involves an extraordinarily complex set of
analytical skills. Breaking all of this down into a routine that could be
done on a rote basis would be extremely difficult. An empirical legal
scholar would also be required to decide how far afield to look for
precedent, whether an argument by analogy is appropriate, and how
to account for the normative weight and persuasive authority of past
cases. Given these issues and the limitations of even foreseeable
computing, it seems likely that directly coding “precedent” as an
independent variable will remain extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible, for a long time.
A small number of empirical legal studies have attempted to
develop some method for examining the role of precedent, but the
task is daunting. Lindquist and Cross constructed a study to test
whether judges’ ideological preferences are given freer rein in cases
of first impression, where there is no controlling precedent. They used
lawyers’ descriptions and assessments of judges in the Almanac of the
Federal Judiciary, supplemented by characteristics of the appointing
president, for the “ideology” variable, and selected cases from several
circuits where either the majority or the dissent “expressly noted that
86
the case raised an issue of first impression.” Lindquist and Cross
then conducted logistic regression analysis and found that “judicial
87
ideology is stronger in cases of first impression.” Putting aside the
question of whether the nonrandom sample of assessments offered by
86. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1180–81 (2005).
87. Id. at 1184.
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lawyers who respond to queries from the almanac are a suitable
measure of judicial “ideology,” and the authors’ inability to account
for judicial deliberations, the Lindquist and Cross study suggests that
cases of first impression are different in some measurable way from
88
cases with relatively clear precedent. Cross has also published two
analyses that are meant to test the effect of law on judicial
decisionmaking. He analyzed whether courts show affirmance
deference—i.e., whether courts tend to affirm lower court decisions—
and found that affirmance deference is a powerful predictor of
89
appellate decisionmaking. Cross also found that in cases involving a
controlling legal threshold, such as jurisdiction or standing, those
90
thresholds “appear to exercise some classical legal tug.” In each
instance, the Cross studies suggest that law influences appellate
decisionmaking.
Because many of the factors that contribute to judicial
decisionmaking are either inaccessible, such as judicial deliberations,
or extremely difficult to measure, such as precedent and the myriad
personal beliefs and values that make up a judge’s “ideology,”
empirical studies tend to focus on factors that are more amenable to
empirical study—such as party of appointing president—even if those
factors ultimately have little explanatory power. The real problem
here is not that scholars focus on variables that are more easily
measured, but that some empirical studies exaggerate their
conclusions and leave readers with the impression that there is strong
evidence showing a powerful across-the-board relationship between
91
the party of appointing president and appellate decisionmaking.
And from this, readers are sometimes led to believe that appellate
decisionmaking is largely influenced by the judges’ personal
ideological preferences. Readers often may not understand the
coding problems inherent in many empirical studies, the problems
underlying proxies for ideology, and the differences between moral
88. In another part of the study, Lindquist and Cross found that, in the context of
interpreting the phrase “under color of” state law from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the power of precedent
to reduce the predictive power of the almanac variable does not uniformly increase over time.
Id. at 1198–200.
89. CROSS, supra note 5, at 54.
90. Id. at 200.
91. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 150 (2006) (“The most difficult issues are resolved,
[and] the principal empirical findings are clear. In many domains, Republican appointees vote
very differently from Democratic appointees, and ideological tendencies are both dampened
and amplified by the composition of the panel.”).
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and political judgment legitimately exercised in interpreting the law
and extralegal preferences. Nor may they appreciate the
consequences of not including unpublished decisions and not
accounting for case records, the application of law, the effect of
precedent, and the impact of judicial deliberations. For these reasons,
empirical studies should carefully and fully reveal their limitations
and state their conclusions with caution.
II. RECENT EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF DECISIONMAKING IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Legal scholars applying social science methodologies to the
examination of the federal appellate courts have analyzed the effect
of appointment variables on case outcomes in many areas, including
92
review of environmental regulation, and application of the Chevron
93
94
doctrine, as well as the propensity to dissent. Studies also have
95
looked at the influence of Congress on judicial decisions and the
96
contribution of visiting judges. Together, these and other studies
have contributed to “a flowering of ‘large-scale quantitative studies of
97
facts and outcome[s]’” that have ultimately led to “an effort to
understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable
98
hypotheses and large data sets.” Professor Gregory Sisk has
characterized the growth of empirical legal studies as a “‘Quantitative
99
Moment’ in the legal academy.”
We examine three relatively recent contributions to this
“Quantitative Moment”: Frank B. Cross’s Decision Making in the

92. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 8 passim; Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 8
passim.
93. See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 8 passim; Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 38–39 (1998); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1741, 1758–63 (1999) (correlating appointment variables and outcomes in standing cases).
94. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK,
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING
passim (2006).
95. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 52 passim.
96. See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 301
passim (2006).
97. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831,
831 (2008) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (1931)).
98. Id.
99. Sisk, supra note 8, at 876.

EDWARDS IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

5/25/2009 4:05:32 PM

PITFALLS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES

1931

100

U.S. Courts of Appeals (“Cross”), Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade,
Lisa M. Ellman, and Andres Sawicki’s Are Judges Political?: An
101
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (“Sunstein”), and
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner’s, Rational Judicial
102
Behavior: A Statistical Study (“Landes and Posner”). All three
studies focus solely on “published” opinions and do not attempt to
calculate the outcomes reached in the huge mass of “unpublished”
103
court of appeals decisions. As with many of their peers, these
scholars focus mostly on characteristics of judges, such as party of
appointing president, and attempt to draw “causal inferences about
104
the effect of judicial characteristics on outcomes.”
In order to draw these inferences, standard statistical techniques
are used to varying degrees in each of the studies. The results of these
three analyses are consistent with other empirical studies that have
looked at a broad cross section of cases, in that they do not
“demonstrate that any extralegal factor—ideology, judicial
background, strategic reaction to other institutions, the nature of
litigants, or the makeup of appellate panels—explains more than a
105
very small part of the variation in outcomes.”
A. A Look at Sunstein, Are Judges Political?
Sunstein has described federal appellate decisions as “an
extraordinary and longstanding natural experiment . . . involv[ing] the
106
relationship between presidential choices and judicial decisions.”
The “presidential choices” to which Sunstein refers are the choices
that presidents have made in selecting their judicial nominees. The
purpose of Sunstein’s study is to determine “how Republican and
107
Democratic appointees differ from one another.”
The Sunstein study proposes three hypotheses. Sunstein’s first
hypothesis, “ideological voting,” posits that “a judge’s ideological

100. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007).
101. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91.
102. Landes & Posner, supra note 58.
103. CROSS, supra note 5, at 3 (noting the use of two databases of published opinions);
Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 2 (same); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 97, at 18 (“Most of
the relevant studies are limited to published judicial opinions.”).
104. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 97, at 835.
105. Sisk, supra note 8, at 877.
106. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 4.
107. Id.
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tendency can be predicted by the party of the appointing president.”
In his formulation, the phrase “ideological tendency” means the
tendency of a judge to “vote” in a stereotypically conservative or
liberal fashion—where a judge “votes” for a case outcome by joining
the majority and “votes” against the outcome by authoring or joining
109
a dissent. This hypothesis is tested by using the party of the
president that appointed a judge (“party of appointing President” or
110
PAP) as an independent variable, and the judge’s vote—classified
by Sunstein as either “liberal” or “conservative”—as the dependent
111
variable.
The second Sunstein hypothesis, “ideological dampening,” posits
that a judge sitting on a “mixed panel”—that is, sitting with two
judges appointed by presidents of the other party—will be less likely
112
to vote according to his or her own ideological preferences. Sunstein
uses PAP as a proxy for the judge’s ideological leanings to test this
hypothesis and seeks to determine if sitting on a mixed panel reduces
113
the predictive power of PAP for a judge’s vote.
The final hypothesis, “ideological amplification,” posits that
when all of the judges on a panel share ideology, they will be more
114
likely to vote in a stereotypical fashion. To test this hypothesis,
Sunstein again uses PAP as a proxy for ideology and seeks to
determine if PAP is a stronger predictor of a judge’s voting when that
judge sits on a nonmixed panel—that is, one comprised entirely of
115
judges appointed by presidents of the same party.
To test these hypotheses, Sunstein selected 6,408 published
three-judge panel decisions in several relatively high profile and
politically charged areas of law, including abortion, affirmative action,
116
and challenges to environmental regulation. These cases and nearly
20,000 associated individual votes were compiled using a series of
117
relatively straightforward Lexis searches. Each case and vote was

108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id. at 6, 153 nn.4–7 (noting that the party of the appointing president is a “crude” proxy
for judicial ideology).
111. Id. at 163.
112. Id. at 8–9.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 117.
117. Id. at 157–63 nn.2–25.
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then coded as “liberal” or “conservative,” based on the outcome. For
example, in cases involving challenges to environmental regulations,
“[a] vote counted as liberal if it favored upholding an agency’s
decision that was against industry attack, or if it favored striking down
an agency’s decision in the face of a challenge by a public interest
118
group.” The choice between liberal or conservative was binary:
there was no scale; the coding was determined purely by the outcome,
and no account was taken of the reasoning supporting a decision or
119
the effect of governing precedent.
Sunstein then compared the judges’ votes with the party of
appointing presidents. The votes of “Democratic” judges and
“Republican” judges (based on PAP) were compared for each of the
120
types of cases examined. This analysis found differences in voting
patterns in some substantive areas, but not others. The largest
difference was found in the area of gay and lesbian rights, where
Democratic-PAP judges voted for the plaintiff in 57 percent of cases,
but Republican-PAP judges voted for the plaintiff in only 16 percent
121
of cases. Other areas with relatively large differences included
122
capital punishment cases, labor cases, and sex discrimination cases.
There were several areas where there was little or no difference in
voting between Republican-PAP and Democratic-PAP judges,
including criminal appeals, takings cases, and punitive damages
123
cases.
To test the second hypothesis, ideological dampening, Sunstein
sought to identify the effects of other panel members’ ideological
124
preferences on a judge’s vote. PAP is used as a proxy for ideology,
and judges are classified according to the presumed political
affiliation of their panel colleagues into three categories—both
Democratic PAP, one Democratic PAP and one Republican PAP,
125
and both Republican PAP. Here, the authors again found variation
by subject matter. In gay and lesbian cases, where the other two
judges on a panel were both Republican PAP, the third judge voted
in favor of expanding or protecting gay and lesbian rights only 27
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 161 n.20.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20–21 tbl.2-1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23, 163 n.30.
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percent of the time. In contrast, when the other two judges were
Democratic PAP, the third judge voted in favor of expanding or
127
protecting rights 60 percent of the time. Other issue areas—for
example, abortion and capital punishment cases—showed no such
128
effects.
To test the ideological amplification hypothesis, Sunstein
129
compared mixed panels with nonmixed panels. Again, some issue
areas showed greater differences than others. For example, in cases
involving the National Environmental Policy Act, panels consisting of
three Democratic-PAP judges favored an expanded view of the act 71
percent of the time, while panels with two Democratic-PAP judges
and one Republican-PAP judge favored an expanded view of the act
130
42 percent of the time. Sunstein also reports that in deciding cases
131
governed by Chevron, D.C. Circuit panels made up entirely of
Republican-PAP judges invalidated agency action “when expected to
do so on political grounds” 67 percent of the time, while panels with
two Republican-PAP judges and one Democratic-PAP judge did so in
132
38 percent of cases.
Sunstein claims that, in several issue areas, all three
hypotheses—i.e., that judges vote ideologically, that mixed panels
dampen ideological effects, and that nonmixed panels amplify
133
ideological effects—were confirmed.
These areas included
affirmative action cases, labor cases, cases brought under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, cases brought under the National
Environmental Policy Act, desegregation cases, and campaign finance
134
cases. There were five areas where all of the hypotheses were
rebutted: criminal appeals, federalism cases, takings cases, cases
involving punitive damages, and standing cases. In these latter areas,
Sunstein concluded that “there is no significant difference between
the votes of Republican appointees and those of Democratic
135
appointees.” Finally, in abortion and capital punishment cases,
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 20–21 tbl.2-1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 20–21 tbl.2-1.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 80.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 48.

EDWARDS IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

PITFALLS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES

5/25/2009 4:05:32 PM

1935

panel effects were not found—the votes of judges were unaffected by
136
panel composition.
The Sunstein authors conclude that there is “considerable
evidence” confirming that “[f]requently the law is clear” and
appellate judges “simply implement it, no matter who has appointed
137
them.” They claim, however, that, while the results of their study
may leave some questions open, “the most difficult issues are
138
resolved,” and “the principal empirical findings are clear.” “In many
domains,” according to the Sunstein authors, “Republican appointees
vote very differently from Democratic appointees, and ideological
tendencies are both dampened and amplified by the composition of
139
the panel.” The authors thus believe their findings justify specific
policy proposals geared towards encouraging the diversity of
ideological viewpoints on the federal judiciary. Although they “are
not prepared to suggest a formal requirement that federal tribunals
140
should be balanced along party lines,” they conclude that, “in the
141
abstract, a mix is much better than uniformity,” and that “the
evidence outlined [in the book] can easily be taken to support the
view that the Senate has a responsibility to . . . ensure a reasonable
142
diversity of views.”
B. A Look at Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
The Cross analysis differs from Sunstein’s in several key respects.
Rather than limiting the sample to particular issue areas, or
attempting to code case outcome himself, Cross “draw[s] heavily on
143
large, publicly available data sets,” especially the United States
Courts of Appeals Database and the Database on the Attributes of
the United States Appeals Courts Judges, supplemented by other
sources. The courts of appeals database (discussed in Part I.C.1
supra) includes several thousand cases—at least fifteen cases per
144
circuit starting in 1925. The cases have been coded for “numerous
variables,” including “the ideological direction of the decisional
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 54–57.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 141–42.
CROSS, supra note 5, at 3.
Id.
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outcome (whether liberal or conservative) . . . the type of case being
145
decided . . . and some of the legal issues presented in the case.” The
database of attributes provides information on factors such “as race,
146
gender, religion [and] the identity of the appointing president.”
Cross uses these databases and runs a large number of logistic
147
regression analyses to test a variety of hypotheses.
Several chapters of Cross’ study are devoted to the impact of
ideology on judicial decisionmaking. In contrast to the Sunstein study,
which uses PAP as a proxy for ideology, Cross’ “Ideology” variable is
based on a measure created by Michael Giles of Emory University,
which accounts for both the ideological preferences of appointing
presidents and the preferences of “the senators who are typically
148
consulted” during the judicial appointment process. As in the
Sunstein study, the coding of cases as liberal or conservative, part of
the courts of appeals database, is binary. Cross acknowledges that
[t]he available methods for measuring the ideology of judges and
decisions are rough and imperfect. Translating something so
amorphous as ideology into a numerical measure for quantitative
149
analysis will inevitably be imperfect.

Using Giles scores as the independent variable and
conservative/liberal outcome as the dependant variable in a logistic
150
regression, Cross finds a statistically significant relationship that he
interprets to mean that “a unitary change in the judicial ideology
measure [from most conservative to most liberal] will produce a 6%
151
change in associated ideological decisions.”

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Sunstein also uses logistic regression to determine statistical significance. See SUNSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 91, at 163 n.30. However, the main analyses that Sunstein reports are not
based on logistic regressions. Many people are familiar with ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, where a line of “best-fit” is developed for a given data set. Logistic regression is a
form of regression used when the dependent variable is binary. While logistic regression differs
in important ways from OLS regression, the idea is similar and each technique attempts to
model the relationship between variables.
148. CROSS, supra note 5, at 19.
149. Id. at 20.
150. Cross found a logit coefficient of .061. Id. at 24.
151. Id. This finding is based on the coefficient of .061. A logit coefficient must be
interpreted with care. Unlike in the case of ordinary least square regressions, the slope
coefficient in a logistic regression is not (an estimation of) the rate of change in the dependent
variable as the independent variable changes. Rather, the slope coefficient is the rate of change
in the log odds as the independent variable changes. FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION:
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Cross also divides the cases into the following case categories:
criminal, civil rights, First Amendment, privacy, labor relations,
152
economic, and miscellaneous. Cross finds no statistically significant
relationship between Giles scores and outcome in the First
153
Amendment, privacy, and miscellaneous categories.
The
relationship between Giles scores and outcome is strongest in due
process cases, with a relatively strong relationship in labor relations
154
cases as well. Cross then divides the cases into a different set of
categories: constitutional cases, cases interpreting a federal statute,
cases where an amicus curiae filed a brief, class actions, criminal
155
procedure cases, and diversity cases. Again, there are differences.
This time, the strongest relationships are found in cases in which
amici are present, in criminal procedure cases, and in cases in which a
federal statute is in play.
Cross additionally attempts to examine the role of deference to
lower courts in appellate decisionmaking. To do this, he creates a new
independent variable by assigning the lower court decision an
156
ideological label based on case outcome. His regression using the
ideological direction of the lower court decision and Giles scores
found that both Giles scores and the new variable have statistically
157
significant relationships with case outcomes.
Cross also examines panel effects. In the first panel analysis,
Cross looks at the effect on a judge’s vote of “the total ideological
158
[i.e., Giles] score of the other judges on the panel.” He finds that
this variable has a stronger relationship to the judge’s vote than the
159
Cross describes these results as
judge’s own Giles score.

A PRIMER 18–39 (2000). Where logistic regression is used only for the purposes of computing
statistical significance (as in Sunstein’s work), the interpretation of the logit coefficient does not
pose a problem. However, where conclusions are drawn directly from the logit coefficients,
there must be adequate explanation of how those conclusions follow.
152. CROSS, supra note 5, at 27 tbl.1.3.
153. Id. at 27.
154. Id. at tbl.1.3.
155. Id. at 28 tbl.1.4.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 54 tbl.2.2. The logit coefficients were .040 for Giles score and .149 for the new
lower court variable—indicating that the later variable had more explanatory power. Id.
158. Id. at 165.
159. Id. at 165 tbl.6.2. The Giles scores of the other judges (referred to by Cross as
“OtherIdeology”) had a coefficient of .086 and a p-score of .000, while the Giles score of the
judge in question had a coefficient of .020 and a p-score of .106. Id.
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“appear[ing] to show distinct panel effects.” Cross then attempts to
test the “median voter” theory, i.e., the idea that the views of the
median panel voter will carry the day. With the median Giles score
and the total Giles score as independent variables and case outcome
as the dependent variable, Cross finds that the median Giles score
was not statistically significant but that the total Giles score was a
161
statistically significant predictor. Cross interprets the data to mean
that “[t]he median voter theorem appears entirely inapplicable to
162
circuit court panels.” Cross views these analyses as “striking in their
163
demonstration of panel effects.”
Cross examines several other variables, including other
background characteristics of judges, such as the race, gender, and
past employment; the “ideological preferences of the Supreme
164
Court,” as measured by Segal-Cover scores; various measures of the
“preferences of the legislature” at the time of decision; and the types
of litigants before the court. Cross finds these variables to have either
no statistically significant relationship or weak relationships to
outcomes.
Cross concludes that, while appointment variables had
measurable effects, they had “very limited . . . explanatory power,”
especially when compared to legal variables for which “there was
consistently a statistically significant association that was robust to
165
different samples and control variables.” Among the important
legal variables studied was deference to lower court decisions, which
was “by far the most important single variable substantively in
166
explaining circuit court outcomes.” Cross also suggests that, on

160. Id. at 165.
161. Id. at 166 tbl.6.3. The median Giles score (referred to by Cross as “MedianIdeology”)
had a coefficient of .04 and a p-score of .816. The total Giles score (referred to by Cross as
“TotalIdeology”) had a coefficient of .087 and a p-score of .003. Id.
162. Id. at 166.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 103. Segal-Cover scores were developed by Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover
and attempt to identify ideological leanings of Supreme Court Justices using newspaper articles
about the Justice prior to confirmation. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557
(1989) (using content-analytic techniques to create a predictive attitudinal model for judges’
voting).
165. CROSS, supra note 5, at 229.
166. Id. at 228.
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mixed panels, the use of “nonideological law [can be] a persuasive
167
argument that overcomes ideological preferences.”
C. A Look at Landes and Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior
Landes and Posner take a similar approach in a recent study that
looks at both Supreme Court and appellate court decisions. They
propose an informal model of a “rational-choice (economic)
168
approach to judicial behavior.” Landes and Posner assume that,
because federal judges have life tenure, external motivations such as
fear of firing or hope of promotion are largely irrelevant. Rather, they
“expect that leisure” would be a major judicial motivation as well as
“self-expression, for example of political preferences,” and “esteem
169
(prestige, reputation, etc.).”
Based on this model, Landes and Posner conduct an analysis of
the same database used in the Cross study, but only after making
some corrections for the coding errors discussed in Part I.C.2 supra.
Like Sunstein and Cross, Landes and Posner examine the relationship
between political factors and judicial votes. The political variables in
the Landes and Posner study are “party of appointing President,” as
well as the composition of the Senate at the time of a judge’s
appointment. The Landes and Posner analysis shows a statistically
significant relationship between PAP and the percentage of judges’
votes that were conservative or liberal. However, these relationships,
170
while statistically significant, were not very powerful. Landes and
Posner also found that the partisan composition of the Senate had a
statistically significant relationship with the fraction of judges’ votes
171
that were conservative or liberal in civil, but not in criminal, cases.
Gender and race were not found to be significant predictors of
judges’ votes.
Landes and Posner, like Sunstein and Cross, are interested in the
group dynamics on the bench as well. Landes and Posner, however,
take a different approach from Sunstein and Cross. Rather than
167. Id. at 168.
168. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 4.
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 56 tbl.12. In Landes and Posner’s analysis, whether PAP was Republican was the
independent variable. The coefficient for fraction conservative in civil cases was .023; the
coefficient for fraction liberal in civil cases was -.028; the coefficient for fraction conservative in
criminal cases was .059; the coefficient for fraction liberal in criminal cases was -.051. Id.
171. See id. (noting that the coefficients were .192 for fraction conservative, and -.193 for
fraction liberal in civil cases).
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looking at particular panel compositions, Landes and Posner look to
the fraction of judges on a circuit appointed by a given party. They
test three hypotheses: the “conformity hypothesis,” the “group172
polarization hypothesis,” and the “political-polarization effect.” The
first hypothesis is that an increase in the number of Republicans on a
circuit “will increase the likelihood that any judge in the circuit will
173
cast a conservative vote.” The second is that “judges appointed by
Republican Presidents will vote more conservatively in response to an
increase in the fraction of the judges on their court appointed by
Republican Presidents[,] but that judges appointed by Democratic
174
Presidents will not.” The final hypothesis is that “an increase in the
size of one of the blocs relative to another will cause the second to
175
vote more antagonistically to the first.”
Landes and Posner found that the conformity hypothesis was
supported by their analysis. In a multivariable regression that
accounted for PAP as well as other variables, the fraction of
Republicans in a circuit was significantly correlated with the fraction
of conservative votes, with a coefficient of .221—much larger than the
.092 coefficient for PAP in that regression. Landes and Posner
interpret that to mean that if, “in a circuit that has 6 judges appointed
by Republican Presidents and 6 appointed by Democratic Presidents,
one of the judges that had been appointed by a Democratic President
is replaced by a judge appointed by a Republican President,” then
“[t]he mean value of the fraction of conservative votes in civil cases
for the average judge will increase from .52 to .54” and in criminal
176
cases “from .74 to .78.”
There was “some evidence of group polarization” such that “the
177
in-group becomes more extreme.”
The political-polarization
hypothesis, which postulates that the minority becomes more
antagonistic to the majority the fewer its members, was not
supported. Based on these findings, Landes and Posner concluded
that there was
a triple effect of a change in the ideological composition of a court
when a member of the [Democratic] minority bloc on the court . . . is

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 33, 34.
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replaced by a member of the [Republican] majority bloc: The
majority becomes larger and therefore the court becomes more
conservative irrespective of any group effects; the members of the
majority become more conservative than they were when there were
178
fewer of them; and the minority becomes more docile.

Landes and Posner also offer a “possible economic explanation”
for the conformity effect in the appellate courts, which they did not
find in the Supreme Court.
The workload of the courts of appeals is heavier than that of the
Supreme Court . . . . Especially given leisure preference, the heavier
workload in the courts of appeals makes the cost of a dissent
greater . . . . The heavier workload also increases the benefits of
decision according to precedent, which greatly reduces the time and
effort involved in a decision; instead of having to analyze the case
from the ground up, the court looks for a very similar previous case
179
and decides the new case the same way.

According to Landes and Posner, due to heavy workloads in the
courts of appeals, appellate judges have little incentive to dissent,
knowing that the majority opinion will be followed and the dissent
will be ignored in future cases.
III. WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES DO NOT TELL US
VERY MUCH ABOUT APPELLATE DECISIONMAKING
A. Our Assessment of Empirical Legal Studies That Attempt to
Understand Extralegal Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking
The Cross, Landes and Posner, and Sunstein studies represent
some of the most recent, large-scale efforts to apply empirical
methodology to the study of judicial decisionmaking in the federal
courts of appeals. It is fair to ask whether, given their conceptual and
methodological limitations, these studies tell us anything new,
interesting, or useful about judicial decisionmaking. One noteworthy
finding of these projects is that, even on their own limited terms, the
studies do not show that a substantial percentage of published federal
appellate cases are decided on political or ideological grounds (as
crudely defined). In other words—and again on their own terms—
178. Id. at 34.
179. Id. at 34–35.
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empirical studies predict very little about the effects of extralegal
factors on appellate decisionmaking. And, unsurprisingly, the studies
do not refute the claim that case records, the applicable law,
controlling precedent, and judicial deliberations are critically
important determinants of appellate decisionmaking.
Because the Cross and Landes and Posner studies looked at a
random sample of cases (putting aside the absence of any data on
“unpublished decisions—an important caveat), those studies provide
the more meaningful bases from which to draw general conclusions
about the judiciary. Perhaps most striking is the degree to which the
party of appointing president and the Giles scores were not found
predictive of appellate court decisions. Cross found that nonlegal
variables, such as party affiliation, had, in general, “very limited . . .
180
explanatory power.” In Landes and Posner’s regressions, while the
party of appointing president was a statistically significant variable, it
was not strongly predictive of the fraction of conservative or liberal
181
votes of appellate judges. As Cross explains, statistical significance
in studies with large data sets does not alone imply a strong
relationship—it simply means that the presumed relationship is
unlikely to be one that resulted from chance, and therefore the
relationship is probably genuine, whether strong or weak. The
hypothesis that law substantially influences outcomes in most cases
certainly has not been disproved by the analyses offered in the Cross
and Landes and Posner studies.
The Sunstein study principally focuses on substantive areas of
the law in which the authors expected to find the largest effect from
ideology. They found that the party of appointing president had
statistically significant relationships with judicial decisions within
some, but not all, of the substantive areas that they studied. The
Sunstein study thus suggests some areas of law in which the party of
appointing president may have more of a relationship to case
outcomes than others. However, the Sunstein study also expresses the
view that “[f]requently the law is clear, and judges should and will
182
simply implement it, no matter who has appointed them.” The data
in their study do not in any way refute this view.
The studies on “panel effects”—that is, the effects that judges
have on one another in appellate decisionmaking—tend to confirm
180. CROSS, supra note 5, at 229.
181. Id. at 4–5.
182. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 5.
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the widely shared understanding that judges are influenced by each
other. Neither Cross, Landes and Posner, nor Sunstein investigated
whether these panel effects are the result of genuine judicial
deliberations or “strategic voting” on the part of judges. Any
conclusion that judges’ behavior is dominated by the latter has not
been shown.
The answer to the question of whether politics or ideology plays
a role in judicial decisionmaking is most significant in the normative
sense—that is, does politics or ideology play an inappropriate role in
judicial decisionmaking? Given that we would want and expect some
aspects of “ideology” to bear on judicial decisionmaking—for
example, in situations in which ideological or political questions are
intrinsic to law—the mere fact that ideology plays some role is hardly
cause for concern. Even where appointment variables have
statistically significant relationships to case outcomes, the existence of
a relationship (especially a weak one) is only troubling for someone
who believes that, during the appointment process, it is inappropriate
for presidents and senators to take into account judicial
characteristics that may potentially bear on the moral and political
questions that appropriately arise in legal disputes or are intrinsic to
law itself. It surely does not indicate that, once confirmed, judges act
inappropriately or place their personal leanings over respect for their
understanding of governing law and precedent. Judges have
maintained for decades that “they follow the law in the substantial
proportion of the cases where the legal result is clear [and] in the
remaining cases they do the best they can to arrive at the strongest
183
legal answer.” The simple point here is that appointment variables
manifestly cannot show that judges are abusing their roles on the
bench by forwarding their personal preferences at the expense of
governing law or abusing their legitimate discretion.
When thinking about these matters, it is important to recall that,
in their “published” opinions, federal appellate judges routinely
184
render unanimous decisions about 90 percent of the time. The rate
of dissents is much lower when “unpublished” decisions—which in
2007 constituted over 80 percent of the cases decided by the appellate
183. Tamanaha, supra note 46 (manuscript at 11).
184. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 237 (1999). Administrative Office of the Courts data on the
D.C. Circuit show that dissent rates hover from below 5 percent to 10 percent of cases for which
opinions were written. When all dispositions (including unreported judgments) are taken into
account, the dissent rate is even lower.
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In other words, judicial deliberations
courts —are counted.
produce agreement in the vast majority of cases decided in the federal
courts of appeals. This is an impressive feat, given the complex set of
laws that must be interpreted by the judiciary and the fact that judges
are required to exercise discretion in a number of cases. “No more
could be asked or expected of a rule of law system manned by human
187
judges.”
If politics and partisan ideological gamesmanship ruled the day
on the federal bench, the high level of consensus would almost
certainly fall. It is no answer to suggest that judges often vote to join
opinions to avoid the cost of dissent. Indeed, this argument borders
on absurd. A judge is not appreciably burdened if she or he decides to
dissent, for all the judge need do is say, “I dissent.” Even if a judge
elects to write an opinion in dissent, no undue effort is involved once
the judge has read the parties’ briefs, heard oral argument, engaged in
deliberations with the other judges on the panel, and read the
majority opinion. The simple point here is that the lack of dissenting
opinions shows that judges appointed by both Democrats and
Republicans usually can, and do, agree on the requirements of the
law, without regard to their political and ideological leanings. And the
low rate of dissents indicates a commitment by appellate judges to
follow their shared understanding of governing precedent. This is not
surprising. The individuals who make up the federal appellate bench
are, by and large, a highly dedicated and committed group. Most
members of the bench care about the law, about acting responsibly
towards the litigants before them, and about discharging their duty to
the American people according to the highest professional standards.
B. Response to Potential Critiques of Our Assessment of Empirical
Legal Studies
There are two areas of disagreement that might arise with
respect to our analysis of empirical legal studies. We address these
matters in turn.
1. Crude Proxies and the Unsophisticated Separation of Law and
Values. We have argued that a number of empirical legal studies are
deficient because of the crudeness of the measures used to assess
185. See supra note 69.
186. Judges rarely dissent in “unpublished” decisions.
187. Tamanaha, supra note 46 (manuscript at 12).
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judicial “ideology.” In particular, the use of the party of a judge’s
appointing president is an attenuated and flattened-out
representation of a judge’s ideology; and the characterization of case
outcomes as “liberal” or “conservative” is maddeningly simplistic
(both because of the assumption it makes about the straightforward
ideological valence of results and because of the disregard it shows
for dispositions that are more subtle than “affirm” and “reverse”).
There are two potential responses to our critique, both of which
fail. First, it might be argued that the crudeness of an independent
variable generates noisy—rather than invalid—results. It is often the
case in empirical studies involving correlational analyses that
researchers do not have direct access to the phenomena they want to
measure and must therefore resort to proxies. Proxies are in their
nature imperfect representations of those phenomena. But so long as
there is a general correlation between the proxy and the underlying
phenomenon (and in particular, so long as the proxy is not correlated
significantly with the absence of that phenomenon), the imperfections
merely burden the estimates with a degree of randomness or noise
that actually reduces the likelihood of detecting real and significant
effects. If the researcher finds significant effects notwithstanding the
admitted noisiness of such measures, there is reason to believe that
there are significant correlations between the true phenomena the
proxies represent. Second, some empirical scholars might simply
demur, arguing that PAP should not be treated as anything other than
PAP, and that outcome labels should not be seen as anything more
than labels attached to outcomes. These empirical scholars will then
say that, on this view of their work, there is still a significant
relationship between PAP and case outcomes, and that the
correlation cannot be connected to anything intrinsic to legal
reasoning.
Neither of the foregoing claims holds up under close scrutiny.
The crudeness of the measures used to support the ideology thesis
rest on an implausibly formalistic and positivistic conception of law.
The hypothesis that judicial decisionmaking is influenced by the
ideology of judges is remarkable only if and to the extent that ideology
is extrinsic to law. If we do not subscribe to this assumption, then both
law and ideology can influence outcomes, and greater contributions
from the later tell us nothing about the contribution of the former.
The crude measure of “ideology” fails to discriminate between forms
of moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those extrinsic to law.
It is well understood that legal reasoning partakes of moral judgment
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in cases in which judges routinely exercise delegated or common law–
making authority. This need not, and generally does not, take the
form of personal whim or preference. Rather, in cases where the law
requires it, judicial decisionmaking can include a situated and
disciplined elaboration of the conventional norms of the American
political community. This occurs in both “hard” and “very hard”
cases, including, for example, cases involving judicial resolutions of
disputes in areas of law ranging from constitutional interpretation to
the administration of the antitrust laws. This reality might be
contested by some, but it is far and away the dominant understanding
188
of how adjudication works in our judicial system.
On this account, some play for inherently contestable political
judgments is simply built into law and strikes us as a normal
constituent of good judging. It is obvious—to the point of being
mundane—to suggest that there is a correlation between how
individual judges will carry out this aspect of judicial reasoning and
their “ideologies.” When positive law is imprecise and judges are
required to exercise delegated or common law–making authority in
hard or very hard cases, they often are obliged to refer to the
conception of our community’s political morality that strikes them as
the most compelling. Good examples of this are seen in the political
(Meiklejohnian) conception of free speech that animated the
189
Supreme Court’s seminal decision New York Times v. Sullivan, in
the neoclassical conception of economics that triumphed with the
190
Borkian “public welfare” understanding of antitrust law, and in the
188. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 130–50 (1986). Compare Japan Whaling
Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1986) (“[N]ot every matter touching on
politics is a political question, and . . . it is ‘error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962))), with United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (“What government is to be
regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial
question, and is to be determined by the political department of the government.” (quoting
Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938))).
189. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 138 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing New York Times v. Sullivan and invoking
Meiklejohn); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208, 221 n.125 (noting, in discussing New York
Times v. Sullivan, that “[t]he Amendment has a ‘central meaning’—a core of protection of
speech without which democracy cannot function” and that Professor Mieklejohn had described
the case as “an occasion for dancing in the streets”).
190. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710, 2714
(2007) (overruling the holding of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911), that it is a per se violation of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to agree with its
distributor to set a minimum price for the good at issue and citing Bork regarding the
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extensive jurisprudence surrounding the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements pursuant to section 301 of the Labor
191
Management Relations Act. The judging that gave rise to those
conceptions of law can be described as either (1) not ideological in
any manner opposed to law or (2) ideological in a manner intrinsic to
law itself. These views of the law defeated competing conceptions
that, had they triumphed, would likewise have been characterized
either as nonideological or ideological in a law-like way.
Judges who exercise delegated or common law–making authority
to decide cases of this sort (whether they involve First Amendment
issues, antitrust law, or other similarly complex questions that come
before the courts) are obliged to rely—and to do so self-consciously
and overtly—on political and ideological values in their legal
reasoning. This cannot seriously be doubted, nor can it reasonably be
seen as surprising. It is merely part of the judicial function. If one
“procompetitve” effects of resale price maintenance (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 288–91 (1978))); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 16 (1997) (overruling the
holding of Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), that vertical maximum price fixing is a
per se violation of the Sherman Act and quoting Bork for the proposition that such price fixing
had “no anticonsumer effect” (quoting BORK, supra, at 281–82)).
191. In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
the Court held that a grievance-arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement could
be enforced against unions and employers under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, id. at 451. The Court found that congressional
policy, as embodied in section 203(d) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), was to promote
industrial peace and that the grievance-arbitration provision of a collective agreement was a
major factor in achieving this goal. Id. at 453–55. In the seminal “Steelworkers Trilogy,” the
Court amplified this policy by declaring that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes
under a collective bargaining agreement would be enforced unless it could “be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582–83 (1960); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596–97 (1960) (part of the Steelworkers trilogy); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960) (same); cf. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1987) (emphasizing that a court may not set aside an arbitrator’s award
on grounds of public policy unless the policy clearly can be “ascertained ‘by reference to laws
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests’”
(quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) (holding that an employee’s statutory right to trial de novo under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, is not foreclosed by prior submission of
claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining
agreement); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 237–38 (1970)
(holding that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, do
not preclude a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation
under a collective bargaining agreement when the agreement contains provisions enforceable
under section 301(a) of the LMRA for binding arbitration of the grievance dispute concerning
which the strike was called).
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accepts that such reasoning is legal reasoning, then any regression
model that uses a crude measure of ideology that spills over to
evaluative reasoning of this sort will produce results that merely state
the obvious, i.e., that judicial disagreement over how to understand
the law helps explain variations in case outcomes.
Empirical studies of this sort, in sum, assume not only that
judicial decisionmaking is sometimes influenced by the ideology of
judges, but also that ideology is invariably extrinsic to law. But this
turns out, surprisingly, to be a normative claim (one it seems unlikely
that most empirical theorists would actually endorse) in the guise of
an empirical one. The fact is that most members of the legal
profession—judges, lawyers, and scholars—subscribe to a conception
of law that sees forms of moral or political reasoning as intrinsic to
law in some circumstances. Thus, empirical scholars can convince us
to accept their central claim (that extralegal judicial “ideology”
explains variation in some legal outcomes) only if they first convince
us that we are wrong in our view that some political and ideological
questions are intrinsic to law itself. In other words, empirical
ideologists must convince us that we should adopt a formalistic or
“hard” positivistic theory that insists that legal questions never
subsume moral or political questions. But, of course, if empirical
scholars could do this (assuming they wanted to), they would not be
showing that judges have been substituting their ideology for law but,
rather, that judges have been following a conception of law that we
should reject for normative reasons. And, if they are right in this,
their claim would be recognized as a contribution to philosophical
jurisprudence, not empirical legal studies.
2. Omitted Variables. We have also argued that any empirical
study that attempts to assess appellate decisionmaking without taking
account of variables like the applicable law, controlling precedent,
and judicial deliberations will be incomplete. In response to this
critique, it can be argued that there is a difference between omitted
variables and omitted variable bias. Omitting relevant variables
creates bias when one has reason to believe that those variables might
be related to ones in the model, because then one cannot rule out that
the observed effect between the included variables and the dependent
variable is due in whole or in part to the omitted ones. But where
there is no correlation between independent variables, the omission
of one should have no effect on the estimate of another on the
dependent variable. The argument runs that because the influence of
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law, precedent, and deliberations across cases is not correlated with
the ideology of the judges who decide them (or with PAP or any
other measure of it), leaving the former variables out does not bias
any estimate of how much of the variance in outcomes is attributable
192
to ideology; it merely reduces the model’s power.
There are at least two problems with the foregoing argument.
First, there are convincing reasons to believe that judicial deliberation
is an institutional practice that mitigates the impact of “bad” ideology
(in the form of judges’ willful or subconscious indulgence of political
or ideological predilections extrinsic to legal reasoning) on judicial
decisionmaking. Given this reality, it is fair to assume that such “bad”
ideology matters less, and precedent or any other law-intrinsic
influence matter more, as the quality of judicial deliberations
improves. Therefore, omitting variables like deliberation and
precedent will distort the result of a theoretical analysis capable of
measuring “bad” ideology by failing to capture a likely interaction
between it and law-intrinsic influences like deliberation. Thus, so long
as we have good reason to believe that the quality of judicial
deliberations matters, we have good reason to believe that an
empirical model that leaves out this variable will falsely suggest that
ideology’s influence is immutable and endemic to judicial
decisionmaking rather than the source of a correctable pathology that
is likely concentrated in relatively discrete segments of the federal
circuit courts at any given time. Second, empirical studies also go
wrong when they assume that as ideological correlations go up,
precedent correlations invariably go down. This is not a safe
assumption, because higher correlations between ideology and case
outcomes tell us nothing about the relationship between controlling
precedent and case outcomes. And if a case outcome adheres to
controlling precedent, it really does not matter whether the outcome
is consistent with judges’ personal political or ideological views. If
empirical ideologists want to study the effect of precedent on case
outcomes, they need to do it directly, not simply as the inverse of
PAP correlation.

192. Indeed, omitting variables also increases the standard errors of included variables, and
hence the omission of precedent and deliberation may reduce the likelihood of finding a
significant effect from ideology. See JACOB COHEN, PATRICIA COHEN, STEPHEN G. WEST &
LEONA S. AIKEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 143–44 (3d ed. 2003).
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3. The Bottom Line—Empirical Studies Do Not Tell Very Much
about the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking. We recognize
that questions relating to crude proxies and omitted variables may be
areas of potential disagreement. But (for the reasons indicated above)
we do not believe that the objections that might be raised can defeat
the principal concerns that we raise in this Article. In the end,
however, any disagreements that arise will be of little moment. For, as
noted above, on their own limited terms, the empirical studies that we
have discussed show that a substantial percentage of published
federal appellate decisions are resolved on grounds other than
ideology and politics. We can only assume that unpublished decisions
would show even less effect from nonlegal factors. The simple point
here—one that has been acknowledged by several leading empirical
legal scholars—is that empirical studies generally are not able to
predict much about the effects of extralegal factors on appellate
193
decisionmaking.
194

IV. AN INSIDER’S LOOK AT THE DECISIONS OF THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT REVIEWING
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTIONS BETWEEN 2000 AND 2008
I have had the good fortune to sit as a member of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for twenty-nine years, serving as Chief
Judge for seven years. I have worked with many brilliant colleagues
who have been notably diverse in their backgrounds, skills, interests,
and political leanings. I have been most impressed, however, with the
intellect, independence, integrity, and commitment of my colleagues.
I have never worked with a colleague who was lazy, unprepared, or
shy about expressing his or her views. My life as an appellate judge
has been fulfilling in large part because I have worked with colleagues
who have been largely committed to applying the law and adhering to
precedent, not giving vent to their political and ideological leanings.

193. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 5, at 202 (“The close study of precedents and their impact
[on appellate decisionmaking] is impossible with currently available or readily foreseeable
empirical tools.”); Sisk, supra note 8, at 884 (“More sophisticated statistical models that include
legal factors and legal reasoning as variables are perhaps the greatest priority in continued
quantitative examination of the federal judiciary. A fully specified legal model will prove
eternally elusive [however] because legal reasoning is not formulaic in nature: the reasonable
parameters for debate on the determinate nature of text and doctrine cannot be described by
number.” (footnote omitted)).
194. This Part has been written solely by Judge Edwards.
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This is not to say that life on the court of appeals always has been
easy. “During my extended tenure on the D.C. Circuit, now in its
third decade, I have seen the court go through many different phases
and express a number of different moods. It has gone from a divided
and divisive place, to one stamped with the [best elements] of
195
collegiality.” The importance of collegiality cannot be overstated.
When I speak of a collegial court, I do not mean that all judges are
friends. And I do not mean that the members of the court never
disagree on substantive issues. That would not be collegiality, but
homogeneity or conformity, which would make for a decidedly
unhealthy judiciary. Instead, what I mean is that judges have a
common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law
right, and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be
persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect. Collegiality is
a process that helps to create the conditions for principled
agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and considered.
Specifically, it is my contention that collegiality plays an important
part in mitigating the role of partisan politics and personal ideology
by allowing judges of differing perspectives and philosophies to
communicate with, listen to, and ultimately influence one another in
196
constructive and law-abiding ways.

The D.C. Circuit has benefitted from collegiality among its
members, most notably during the last fifteen to eighteen years. This
is not to deny that there have been sharp differences among judges
during deliberations over some hard and very hard cases. There also
have been some decisions that have drawn strong dissents. There
have even been a few rehearings en banc, but not many. On
occasions, my colleagues and I have weighed moral/political
questions, especially when those questions are intrinsic to the law
itself. And on some occasions, we may even have been influenced by
extralegal factors. But for the most part, my colleagues and I have
197
deliberated seriously and focused on getting the law right.
Based on my twenty-nine years on the court, my claim is that
decisions are based on legal materials and are the product of fruitful
judicial deliberations. In other words, the case record, applicable law,
195. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1648.
196. Id. at 1644–45 (footnotes omitted).
197. Judge Posner has suggested that judges “don’t deliberate very much” and that “Judicial
deliberation is overrated.” Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1051. I could not
disagree more. It may be that his experience on the Seventh Circuit has been different from
mine on the D.C. Circuit.
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controlling precedent, and deliberations—not impermissible political
or ideological considerations—are what appellate judges focus on in
reaching a consensus in most cases, even those that are “hard” and
“very hard.” Legal scholars who have attempted to measure “panel
effects” to determine whether judges impermissibly rely on extralegal
factors in their decisionmaking are merely guessing in their
conclusions. The truth is that these scholars cannot conclusively show
impermissible ideological voting patterns in the myriad decisions that
issue without a dissent. For example, as Dean Richard Revesz has
stated, “panel effects” can be explained by either a “deliberation
hypothesis,” pursuant to which judges modify their views because
they take seriously the views of their colleagues, or a “dissent
hypothesis,” under which “a judge who sits with two colleagues [from
a different political] party moderates [his or] her views in order to
198
avoid [having to] writ[e] a dissent.” No empirical study has proven
the truth of what has been suggested about panel effects, nor has any
study disproved my claim that judicial deliberations produce
consensus.
I make the further claim that even when a decision draws a
dissent, which is rare, this most often reflects nothing more than an
honest disagreement among the judges over the correct legal result,
not simply a difference in judges’ personal political or ideological
preferences. I am convinced of this based largely on my personal
experiences during my twenty-nine years on the bench. A recent
review of the court’s data also tends to confirm my conviction: when
judges do dissent, they routinely do so across perceived political lines.
That is, in “mixed panels—panels with two judges appointed by the
president of one party and one judge appointed by the president of
the other party—the dissenting judge often is one of the two judges in
the political majority. This is commonplace, as is shown in Appendix
A.
Landes and Posner suggest that there are relatively few dissents
199
in appellate courts because judges prefer to avoid the extra work. In
other words, they claim that, due to heavy workloads, appellate
judges have little incentive to dissent, knowing that the majority
opinion will be followed and the dissent will be ignored in future
cases. Nothing in my experience as an appellate judge supports that
claim. I have found that when a judge earnestly disagrees with the
198. Revesz, supra note 52, at 1112.
199. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 34–35.
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majority and believes that a point of legal principle is a stake, he or
she will dissent. It is true that judges do not waste time writing
separately just to offer their “voice” to the court’s disposition; but
they do dissent when they disagree over matters that they perceive to
be important.
No reliable empirical study shows me to be wrong in my claim
that, although politics, ideology, and/or cognitive factors sometimes
affect our decisionmaking, most appellate decisions are based on legal
materials, not extralegal factors. I say this not to gloat but because I
am comforted—as we all should be—in knowing that it has never
been shown that appellate judges are generally lawless in their work.
It would be disheartening, to say the least, to think that my colleagues
and I routinely ignore the case record, the applicable law, and
controlling precedent and decide cases on the basis of our personal
political views or ideological preferences.
I cannot offer a transcript or other hard data to prove my claim
that the decisions in most “hard” and “very hard” cases benefit from
200
fruitful judicial deliberations. But as someone who has served on
the court for twenty-nine years, I can confidently confirm that this is
so. The court’s low number of dissents is a result of these
deliberations, during which judges air their disagreements and reach
consensus.
Although Cross, Landes and Posner, and Sunstein all appear to
agree that the law substantially determines outcomes in most cases,
neither they nor I can point to any comprehensive quantitative
studies confirming the effects of legal materials on appellate
201
decisionmaking.
And no one has even suggested a way to
meaningfully measure the effects of confidential judicial deliberations
on appellate decisionmaking. What I can offer, however, is a
qualitative view of some of the work of my own court to show a few
salient facts: (1) most decisions issue without a dissent; (2) judges
routinely cross over presumed political lines when they do issue
dissenting opinions; (3) “mixed panels” of the court routinely issue
decisions in numerous complex, difficult, and important cases with no
200. “Easy” cases can be decided easily, with minimal judicial deliberations, so long as every
judge is diligent in reviewing the case record. This is routine.
201. Cross and Lindquist and Cross, himself, have tried in a limited way to measure the
effects of the law and controlling precedent on judicial decisionmaking. See CROSS, supra note
5; Lindquist & Cross, supra note 86, at 1157–58. But a number of empirical scholars have
acknowledged that it is very difficult to capture the effects of law and precedent in a
quantitative study. See supra Part I.C.3.
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dissent; (4) the written decisions in these hard and very hard cases
show, at the very least, that panels interact in a serious way with the
case records, the applicable law, and controlling precedent; and (5)
the court rarely rehears cases en banc. For the data set that I looked
at, it is also worth noting that the number of decisions reversing or
vacating federal agency actions did not materially vary with the
202
composition of the panel with respect to PAP.
In offering this qualitative view of the work of my court, I will
focus on the judgments of the D.C. Circuit reviewing administrative
203
agency actions between 2000 and 2008. I selected this eight-year
period because a Republican president, George W. Bush, was in the
White House, Congress was controlled by Republicans for a majority
of the eight years, and a clear majority of the judges on the D.C.
Circuit was appointed by Republican presidents. I selected
administrative agency actions because it is well understood that this
large category of cases includes some of the most difficult and
controversial appeals heard by the D.C. Circuit. If judges’ personal
political and ideological predilections played a significant role in their
decisions during this period, a place to look for its effect would be the
court’s decisions to support or overturn agency actions (in support of
or against the Republican administration) and/or sharp divisions
among judges along political lines. That is not what our case
dispositions indicate.
The members of the D.C. Circuit during the 2000–2008 period
are shown on the accompanying chart:

202. I include this information more as a qualitative point of interest than a formalized
analytic finding.
203. The data cover cases decided between September 2000 and July 2008. In the database
compiled by the Clerk’s Office for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, cases
involving review of administrative agency actions include matters in which a federal agency is a
party and there is either a direct petition for review, an application for enforcement, a crossapplication for enforcement, or a direct petition for mandamus. The Clerk’s Office review of
administrative agency actions database does not include agency actions that are first reviewed in
the district court and then appealed to the court of appeals. Nor does it include cases that are
resolved by special panels (that is, three-judge panels that dispose of motions for summary
affirmance, summary reversal, dismissals for want of jurisdiction, and dismissals on grounds of
ripeness). Special panels almost always act without hearing oral argument, and they usually
issue unpublished judgments, orders, and memoranda disposing of the matters under review.
Judges almost never dissent from a special panel decision; and special panels rarely reverse
agency actions.
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Active Members of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
September 2000–August 2008
Name
David B. Sentelle,

Year of

Appointing

Appointment

President

1987

Ronald W. Reagan

Chief Judge
Douglas H. Ginsburg

Current Status
Chief Judge since
February 2008

1986

Ronald W. Reagan

Circuit Judge; served
as Chief Judge from
2001–2008

Karen LeCraft

1990

George H. W.

1990

George H. W.

Senior Judge since

Bush

2008

Henderson
A. Raymond

Circuit Judge

Bush

Randolph
Judith W. Rogers

1994

William J. Clinton

Circuit Judge

David S. Tatel

1994

William J. Clinton

Circuit Judge

Merrick B. Garland

1997

William J. Clinton

Circuit Judge

John G. Roberts, Jr.

2003

George W. Bush

Appointed to the
Supreme Court in
2005

Janice Rogers Brown

2005

George W. Bush

Circuit Judge

Thomas B. Griffith

2005

George W. Bush

Circuit Judge

Brett M. Kavanaugh

2006

George W. Bush

Circuit Judge

Harry T. Edwards

1980

James E. Carter,

Senior Judge since

Jr.

2005; Chief Judge
from 1994–2001

Laurence H.

1985

Ronald W. Reagan

Stephen F. Williams

Senior Circuit Judge
204

Silberman

since 2000
1986

Ronald W. Reagan

Senior Circuit Judge
since 2001

As can be seen from the chart, ten of the fourteen judges who served
on the court during 2000–2008 were appointed by Republican
presidents. Former Judge Roberts, who is now a member of the

204. Between February 2004 and March 2005, Judge Silberman served as the cochair of the
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
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Supreme Court and serves as Chief Justice, was a member of the D.C.
Circuit for two of the eight years.
The following chart shows the number of cases involving review
205
of administrative agency action during the 2000–2008 period :
Total Number

Total Number

Total Number

Number of

Number of

of Dispositions

of Lead Case

of Lead Case

Dissents as a

Dissents as a

of “Lead

Dispositions

Dispositions

Percentage of

Percentage of

Involving

Involving

“Total

“Published

Involving

Review of

Review of

Dispositions”

Opinions”

Review of

Administrative

Administrative

Involving

Involving

Administrative

Agency

Agency

Review of

Review of

Agency

Actions

Actions in

Administrative

Administrative

Resulting in

Which a

Agency

Agency

“Published

Dissenting

Actions

Actions

Opinions”

Opinion Issued

713

41

4%

6%

Cases”

206

Actions

913

207

It is clear from these data that very few dispositions involve dissenting
opinions. During the eight years, from September 2000 through July
2008, there were only forty-one instances in which dissenting opinions
issued in cases involving review of administrative agency action. The
frequency of dissents did not increase when I did a rough scan of
agency actions that were first reviewed in the district court and then
appealed to the court of appeals. And, notably, the percentage of
dissenting opinions would be even smaller had I been able to
208
determine the precise number of decisions issued by special panels.
The data also show that judges routinely crossed presumed
political party lines when they dissented. As can be seen in the chart

205. Data compiled by and on file with the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, Washington, D.C.
206. “Lead cases” include all cases that have been consolidated with the principal case
under review. Even though the court’s decision, judgment, or order disposes of more than one
case, only the lead case is counted. For example, a disposition may include a lead case and seven
separate consolidated appeals or petitions for review, but the disposition counts as only one
case.
207. For a definition of cases involving review of administrative agency actions, see supra
note 203. This total number includes both published and unpublished lead case dispositions, but
excludes unpublished decisions issued by special panels.
208. Special panel orders, judgments, memoranda, and opinions almost never draw a
dissent. For an explanation of special panels, see supra note 203. The Clerk’s Office estimates
that, from 2000–2001 through 2007–2008, special panels issued an additional 345 lead-case
dispositions in cases involving administrative agency actions.
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in Appendix A, only forty-one dissents were issued in 913 cases
disposing of actions involving review of administrative agencies.
There were “mixed panel splits” in twenty-two of the forty-one
dispositions—that is, in three-judge panels consisting of judges
appointed by presidents of both political parties, the two judges
appointed by presidents of the same party disagreed; and in en banc
dispositions, judges appointed by presidents of the same party joined
both the majority and dissent. An additional two of the forty-one
dissents involved situations in which all of the judges on the panel
were appointed by presidents of the same political party and one of
the judges dissented. These data indicate that in almost 60 percent of
the cases in which a dissent was filed, the judges did not vote along
209
presumed political party lines.
The chart in Appendix B offers some examples of hard and very
hard cases, involving mixed panels in which the decision of the court
is unanimous. These opinions are offered to show how the judges of
the court carefully consider the record, construe the law, and apply
precedent to reach a consensus in difficult and important cases. All of
the cases cited involved meaningful judicial deliberations, as do most
hard and very hard cases. It is no answer for an empirical legal scholar
to tell us that the judges who joined the decision really did not mean
what is said in the opinion or that some judges concurred in the result
even though they disagreed with the outcome. Empirical legal
210
scholars make such claims, but they are specious. We mean what we
say in our opinions and our judgments constitute the law of the case
211
and the law of the circuit. We take this seriously.
During the eight-year period from September 2000 through July
2008, the court reversed or vacated, in whole or in part, in 245 lead
212
cases involving review of administrative agency action.
The
breakdown of these cases was as follows:

209. The figures were largely the same when I roughly scanned the agency actions that were
first reviewed in the district court and then appealed to the court of appeals.
210. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 35, at 27 (discussing how attitudinalists simply assume that
judges “vote their policy preferences and use legal principles to mask their true motives”).
211. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1396–97 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(holding that one panel of the court may not reconsider a prior panel’s decision in the same
case).
212. Data compiled by and on file with the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, Washington, D.C.
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Total Number of Cases Reversed or Vacated
Number of Cases Reversed or Vacated by a Panel That
Included Three Judges Appointed by a Republican
President
Number of Cases Reversed or Vacated by a Panel That
Included Three Judges Appointed by a Democratic
President

[Vol. 58:1895
245
29

8

During the relevant time period, Republican judicial appointees
outnumbered Democratic appointees by roughly three and a half to
one. It is unsurprising, then, that panels including three judges
appointed by Republican presidents reversed more agency decisions
than panels including three judges appointed by Democratic
presidents.
Finally, during the 2000–2001 through the 2007–2008 terms, only
two cases involving review of administrative agency actions were
213
reheard en banc. Not only do individual judges not dissent very
often, they do not vote to rehear cases that have been decided by
other judges. This, too, is unsurprising to me. If members of the court
trust their colleagues to decide cases based on the applicable law and
controlling precedent, they are not inclined to call for en banc
214
review. The information that is offered here does not constitute a
rigorous quantitative study of the work of my court. But I believe that
the data lend support to my view that, in deciding the cases that come
before our court, my colleagues and I are committed to applying the
law and adhering to precedent, not giving vent to our political and
ideological leanings. In my experience, we achieve this goal most of
the time.

213. Data compiled by and on file with the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, Washington, D.C.
214. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton, The Court En Banc: 1991–2002, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2002) (noting that the number of en banc cases heard by the
D.C. Circuit declined from sixty-three in the 1980s to thirty-three in the 1990s); see also id. at
260 (arguing that the decrease in the number of cases reheard en banc in the D.C. Circuit could
be partially attributed to the judges becoming “more collegial, in the sense that the judges,
notwithstanding their different views, had more confidence in each other’s good faith and
competence, and so deferred more to judgments of panels on which they did not sit”).
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V. CULTURAL COGNITION AND JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS
A. Cultural Cognition
As noted in the earlier Parts of this Article, in seeking to
determine the effects of nonlegal factors on judicial decisionmaking
in the federal courts of appeals, empirical legal scholars routinely
“correlate[] federal judges’ decisions with some measure of their
ideology, typically the political party of the President who appointed
215
them.” There are some scholars who now argue that proponents of
the “ideology thesis” have failed to “adequately specif[y] the
mechanism by which they understand values to be influencing judges.
They have failed, in particular, to distinguish between values as a
self-conscious motive for decisionmaking and values as a subconscious
216
influence on cognition.” These scholars, most notably Professor Dan
Kahan of the Yale Law School and his colleagues at the Cultural
217
Cognition Project, argue that there is a significant difference
between ideology and cultural cognition and that it makes a
difference whether judges are affected by one or the other.
Kahan suggests that there are three very distinct ways in which
judges’ values might influence decisionmaking. “First, values could
supply a self-conscious partisan motivation for decision. That is,
judges could be choosing the outcome that best promotes their
218
political preferences without regard for the law.”
Second, values could supply a self-conscious legal motivation for
decision. On one popular account of judicial decisionmaking,
particularly in constitutional law, there is not a strict separation

215. Kahan, supra note 9, at 1.
216. Id.
217. Yale Law School, The Cultural Cognition Project, http://culturalcognition.net/ (“The
Cultural Cognition Project is a group of scholars from Yale and other universities interested in
studying how cultural values shape the public’s risk perceptions and related policy beliefs.
Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed
matters of fact (for example, whether global warming is a serious threat; whether the death
penalty deters murder; whether gun control makes society more safe or less) to values that
define their cultural identities. Project members are using the methods of various disciplines—
including social psychology, anthropology, communications, and political science—to chart the
impact of this phenomenon and to identify the mechanisms through which it operates. The
Project also has an explicit normative objective: to identify processes of democratic
decisionmaking by which society can resolve culturally grounded differences in belief in a
manner that is both congenial to persons of diverse cultural outlooks and consistent with sound
public policymaking.”).
218. Kahan, supra note 9, at 3.
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between moral reasoning and legal reasoning. Judges must resort to
normative theories to connect abstract concepts like ‘free speech’
219
and ‘equal protection’ to particular cases.

Finally, judges’ understandings of what the law requires may be
“shaped by their values—operating not as resources for theorizing
law, but as a subconscious, extralegal influence on their perception of
220
legally consequential facts.” In other words, especially in areas of
law when it is very difficult “to verify (or falsify) empirical claims by
objective data . . . judges perforce fall back on their emotions or
221
intuitions. They practice . . . ‘cultural cognition.’”
In an article authored by Professor Kahan and Professor Donald
Braman, the authors explain that cultural cognition “refers to the
tendency of individuals to conform their views about risks and
benefits of putatively dangerous activities to their cultural evaluations
222
of those activities.” This tendency extends to evaluations of “the
instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law” based on “cultural
223
evaluations of the activities subject to regulation.” Under the
cultural cognition theory, it is assumed that “people are motivated to
believe that behavior they find noble is also socially beneficial (or at
224
least benign) and behavior they find base is also socially harmful.”
Professor Kahan offers cogent examples of what he and his colleagues
have in mind:
Psychologically speaking, it’s much easier, to believe that behavior
one finds noble is also socially beneficial, and behavior one finds
base is dangerous, than vice versa. Persons who have relatively
individualistic values, for example, tend to be skeptical about
environment risks, because they perceive (subconsciously) that
concerns about such risks could lead to restrictions on commerce
and industry, activities that people with individualistic values like.
People with egalitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and
industry as sources of unjust disparities in wealth, and thus readily
embrace the claim that these activities are environmentally harmful,

219. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
220. Id. at 5.
221. Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1065.
222. Kahan, supra note 9, at 5.
223. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (2006).
224. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 852
(2009).
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and should be regulated. Research . . . shows that these dynamics
generate political conflict on a host of risk issues, from global
warming to domestic terrorism, from school shootings to mandatory
vaccination of school girls against HPV.
Research [additionally] . . . shows that cultural cognition also
creates conflict over legally consequential facts. In one study, for
example, we found that people of egalitarian and hierarchical
dispositions tend to form opposing beliefs about ambiguous facts in
controversial self-defense cases. Egalitarians tended to believe, and
hierarchs to disbelieve, that a battered woman who killed her
abusive husband in his sleep faced a genuine threat, honestly
believed she was in danger, had no realistic opportunity to escape,
and suffered from a psychological impairment of perception;
however, in a case involving a beleaguered commuter who killed a
panhandling African-American teen, it was hierarchs who believed,
and egalitarians who disbelieved, the parallel set of pro-defense
factual claims.
In a second study, [we] found that cultural cognition influenced
perceptions among subjects who watched a videotape of a
high-speed car chase, shot from inside a police cruiser. In Scott v.
Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that “no reasonable jury”
could watch the tape and fail to conclude the driver posed a risk
sufficiently lethal to justify deadly force to stop him (namely, the
ramming of his car). But we found that hierarchical and
individualistic white males were significantly more likely to perceive
that than were egalitarians and communitarians of either race or
225
gender.

The idea of cultural cognition, at least as described by Professor
Kahan and his colleagues, does not square with Judge Posner’s view
226
of “ideology.” Judge Posner argues that “the sources of ideology are
227
both cognitive and psychological,” but he and other empiricists
focus their studies of appellate decisionmaking on the relationships
between case outcomes and observable political factors (for example,
the political party of appointing president). The scholars who seek to
study the effects of cultural cognition on decisionmaking train their
sights on subconscious influences that may affect a judge’s votes. Any

225. Kahan, supra note 9, at 5–6 (footnotes omitted).
226. See Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1059.
227. Id. at 1060.
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relationships between such subconscious influences and the
observable political factors studied by Judge Posner are far from
proven.
Furthermore, the cultural cognition thesis is not simply the
attitudinal model by another name. Variants of the attitudinal model
often are premised on notions of legal realism, which posits that
“legal decisionmaking is substantially congruent with decisionmaking
simpliciter, and . . . legal justification, which attempts to make legal
decisionmaking look more different from nonlegal decisionmaking
than it in fact is, is best seen as a form of stylized and post hoc
228
rationalization.”
Professor Kahan and his colleagues do not
subscribe to this view.
It would not take a flight of fancy to believe that judges are
sometimes affected by subconscious influences on cognition. Does it
matter that this influence is subconscious rather than intentional? Or,
more pointedly, “Does it make any difference whether [appellate]
decisions . . . reflect values as a self-conscious partisan influence on
decisionmaking—the conventional understanding of the ideology
thesis—or as a subconscious cognitive one in the way the cultural
229
cognition theory contemplates?” Professor Kahan argues that
[n]ot only would the cultural cognition thesis, if true, spare us from
the disappointment associated with believing that judicial
disagreement stems from self-conscious, and self-consciously
concealed, political disregard for law. It would also supply us with
tools for mitigating this form of judicial conflict. Research has a [sic]
revealed a variety of techniques for counteracting cultural cognition.
Many of these techniques could likely be employed by judges,
who . . . recognize that they, like everyone else, are prone to adopt
230
factual beliefs congenial to their values.

If scholars were able to catalog meaningfully the effects of
cultural cognition on appellate decisionmaking, the data surely would
be more illuminating than studies resting on judges’ assumed political
predilections as determined by the party of the presidents who
appointed the judges. Individuals are a composite of personal values
231
that extend well beyond their allegiances to political parties. And
individual views may vary (say, from “conservative,” to “moderate,”
228.
229.
230.
231.

Schauer & Wise, supra note 43, at 1096–97.
Kahan, supra note 9, at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
This point is well documented in Kahan et al., supra note 224, at 879.
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to “liberal”) on different issues. We would understand much more
about individual judges and how they think if we understood
cognitive influences on their decisionmaking.
It is far from clear, however, that empirical scholars will ever be
able to meaningfully measure the effects of cultural cognition on
appellate decisionmaking. Even if data could be collected on the
subconscious factors that influence individual judges—no easy task in
itself—it would tell us very little about the product of deliberations
between appellate judges. Individual judges change their minds
during the course of judicial deliberations. While it is possible that
cultural cognition influences how judges view underlying facts or even
legal precedent, the process of deliberation in a collegial environment
can reduce the impact of any individual judge’s cultural cognition.
[J]udging on the appellate bench is a group process. Too often
researchers ignore the fact that appellate judges sit in panels of three
and decide cases together through deliberation. A model that takes
each appellate judge as an atomized individual casting a purely
individual vote in any given case will not produce a good
explanation of how judges decide cases. The appellate courts are
courts of collective decision, and appellate judges act collectively as
233
a court in disposing of cases.

In other words, it is likely the case that judicial deliberations
often will counter any effects of cultural cognition. Therefore, in their
effort to understand the effects of extralegal factors on appellate
decisionmaking, studies of cultural cognition must also take account
of the influence of judicial deliberations; this will be no easy feat
234
given that these deliberations are confidential.
B. Judicial Deliberations
Judicial deliberations, broadly understood, are pervasive
235
throughout the judicial process. Judicial colleagues who have

232. Id. at 879–80.
233. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1656.
234. See Hensler, supra note 85, at 63 (“Researchers simply do not have available very good
quantitative approaches to studying large social organizations [like courts] or interaction
processes [within the courts].”).
235. Deliberation and its hallmarks are at the core of a collegial court:
The deliberately cultivated attitude among judges of equal status and sometimes
widely differing views working in intimate, continuing, open, and noncompetitive
relationship with each other, which manifests respect for the strengths of the others,
restrains one’s pride of authorship, while respecting one’s own deepest convictions,
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worked together over time and come to know each others’
perspectives and views can anticipate one another’s initial “takes” on
certain cases without ever having to discuss the case in detail. In many
such situations, a judge’s cultural cognition can be moderated in
anticipation of a colleague’s views—a kind of tacit deliberation.
Judges deliberate when they raise questions during oral argument to
alert their colleagues to their concerns. Judges deliberate in
conference and continue to deliberate after conference when they
raise issues uncovered in their research. Judges deliberate when they
circulate draft opinions, receive their colleagues’ responses, and
negotiate resolutions to any differences.
There may be some judges who care little about their colleagues’
views and who are determined not to engage in collegial interactions.
However, they are not in the majority. Unless an appellate court is
fractured due to an absence of collegiality, appellate judges routinely
236
deliberate in reaching their decisions.
Indeed, the Judicial
Conference of the United States has placed collegiality at the center
of its definition of a “court”:
[A] “court” is a cohesive group of individuals who are familiar with
one another’s way of thinking, reacting, persuading, and being
persuaded. The court becomes an institution – an incorporeal body
of precedent and tradition, of shared experiences and collegial
feelings, whose members possess a common devotion to mastering
circuit law, maintaining its coherence and consistency (thus assuring
237
its predictability), and adjudicating cases in like manner.

During the course of judicial deliberations, judges more often
than not persuade one another until a consensus is reached. The
238
effect of any individual judge’s cultural cognition is thereby limited.
Because of this important group dynamic, “[a]ny credible attempt to
explain judges’ behavior . . . must take account of the collective
nature of the enterprise. . . . While a judge spends much time working
alone, the crucial decisional points in appellate judging occur in the

values patience in understanding and compromise in nonessentials, and seeks as much
excellence in the court’s decision as the combined talents, experience, insight, and
energy of the judges permit.
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING AND JUDGING 215 (1994).
236. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1648.
237. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
44 (1995).
238. See Kahan et al., supra note 224, at 900–01.

EDWARDS IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

PITFALLS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES

5/25/2009 4:05:32 PM

1965
239

company of, and in active engagement with, one’s colleagues.”
When empirical legal scholars conduct studies that rely solely on the
voting records of appellate judges and case outcomes, they do not
learn enough to fully understand appellate decisionmaking.
[S]tudy of groups also requires consideration of interpersonal
interaction and influence. The fact that two or more Justices vote
together is rather weak evidence that their votes are the result of
interaction; standing alone, voting records tell very little about the
force or direction of any interpersonal influence that may exist.
Small group analysis requires other kinds of data and a more general
understanding of the impact of a group decisional situation on
240
individual behavior.

The group dynamics of judicial decisionmaking are influenced by
a variety of intangible factors including the relative intelligence of the
participating judges, intimidation, friendship, age, aversion to
confrontation, a belief that little is to be gained in disagreement,
impatience, institutional norms and/or rules, and views of the trial
court judge. Special expertise of a particular judge or a reputation for
thoughtfulness and preparation can be credited by other judges
during the deliberation process. Perhaps most important is the role of
precedent in deliberation. All judges are bound by precedent, and
almost all judges recognize this fact. Therefore, arguments about the
meaning of precedent, and the legitimate readings that can be given
to governing precedent, are crucially significant in every case.
Because precedent can be read according to rules that are broadly
shared and understood, even if not objective or universal, judges who
might agree about little else can come to a common reading of
governing law. Consensus typically fails only when the governing
precedent is read in divergent and irreconcilable ways, and judges
disagree in how they would exercise any discretion that is given to the
court by a lack of clarity in the governing law. Before judges admit to
that failure, however, they have ample opportunity to persuade and
look for a reasonable resolution on legal grounds.
In light of these considerations, there are significant difficulties
faced by scholars seeking to build useful models of judicial
decisionmaking from which generalizations may be drawn regarding
the effects of cultural cognition on appellate decisionmaking. It is one

239. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1656, 1657.
240. Walter F. Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1566–67 (1966).
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thing to determine how cultural cognition or ideology may cause
different individuals to view the same evidence differently. It is quite
another matter, however, to determine how and why the views of
these individuals change when they deliberate over their differing
views with an eye toward reaching a consensus.
CONCLUSION
The growing field of empirical legal studies need not conflict
with “the persistent normative appeal of the legal model of
241
judging.” Rather, properly conducted, empirical legal studies can
supplement traditional legal scholarship to “help[] inform litigants,
policymakers, and society as a whole about how the legal system
242
works.” Both judges and scholars can benefit from a productive
conversation between their two perspectives on appellate
decisionmaking.
The potential for fruitful dialogue is lost when judges and
empirical scholars are unable to communicate. There are many
possible reasons for this failure, such as scholars’ use of terms like
“ideology variables” (rather than “appointment variables”) in their
studies. These terms tend to obscure rather than illuminate the issues
under study and add an unnecessary charge to what might otherwise
be a dispassionate discussion of methodological techniques. And
models of appellate decisionmaking that reduce judging to either the
application of fully determinate law or the exercise of bare political
power are not only overly simplistic, but carry a normative valence
that undermines the credibility of the many members of the judiciary
who routinely put aside personal preferences and give due respect to
the law.
In order for empirical scholarship to serve its highest function, it
is of the utmost importance that scholars in this field acknowledge the
limits of their research and maintain an appropriate level of modesty
in their claims. Human institutions that are built on trust, respect, and
a willingness to set aside personal interests for the good of society are
fragile. It is important that institutions serving the public—and the
individuals who comprise them—receive useful feedback. But
critiques will not be taken seriously unless they are well targeted and

241. Sisk, supra note 8, at 894.
242. Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1741, 1741 (2004).
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supported in fact. Empirical legal studies can play a productive role in
strengthening legal institutions by providing insights on the judicial
process and suggesting areas for reform. This productive role will
only increase as the field matures in its understanding of what it can,
and cannot, do.
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243

Dissenting Opinions in Cases Involving Review of Administrative
Agency Actions from September 2000–July 2008
Case Name; Citation;
and Court Term

Majority
and Judge
Writing for
Majority (*)

Dissenting
Judge[s]
[“MPS”=
mixed panel
244
split]
[“PS” = panel
245
split]

Court’s Action as
Described in Westlaw

Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 208 F.3d 229
(D.C. Cir. 2000)

Tatel*
Rogers

Sentelle

Cross-application
granted; petition
denied.

Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 237 F.3d 639
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc)

Tatel*
Edwards
Williams
Rogers
Tatel
Silberman

Sentelle*
Ginsburg*
Henderson
Randolph
[MPS]

Enforcement granted.

Crowley Marine Servs.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 234 F.3d
1295 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(per curiam)

(per curiam)
Edwards
Sentelle

Henderson
[MPS]

Petition denied;
cross-application
granted.

Yukon-Kuskokwim
Health Corp. v. NLRB,
234 F.3d 714 (D.C. Cir.
2000)

Ginsburg*
Tatel

Randolph
[MPS]

Enforcement denied;
remanded.

Garvey Marine, Inc. v.
NLRB, 245 F.3d 819
(D.C. Cir. 2001)

Ginsburg*
Rogers

Randolph
[MPS]

Employer’s petition
denied; Board’s
application granted.

243. Cases compiled by the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
Washington, D.C.
244. “MPS” denotes decisions involving mixed panels, that is, a three-judge panel consisting
of judges appointed by presidents of both political parties in which the two judges appointed by
presidents of the same party disagree. In an en banc decision, it means that judges appointed by
presidents of the same party joined both the majority and dissent.
245. “PS” denotes decisions in which all of the judges on the panel were appointed by
presidents of the same political party, and one of the judges dissented.
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Ross Stores, Inc. v.
NLRB, 235 F.3d 669
(D.C. Cir. 2001)

Henderson*
Randolph

Garland

Petition for review
granted in part and
denied in part, and
enforcement denied in
part.

Sinclair Broad. Group,
Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d
148 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

Rogers*
Williams

Sentelle
[MPS]

Remanded.

Ruggiero v. FCC, 278
F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir.
2002)

Tatel*
Rogers

Henderson

Relief granted.

KPMG, LLP v. SEC,
289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir.
2002)

Rogers*
Henderson

Randolph
[MPS]

Petition denied.

Seattle Opera v.
NLRB, 292 F.3d 757
(D.C. Cir. 2002)

Henderson*
Rogers

Randolph
[MPS]

Petition denied; crossapplication granted.

New World Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164
(D.C. Cir. 2002)

Henderson*
Rogers

Randolph
[MPS]

Appeal dismissed.

BFI Waste Sys. of N.
Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.
2002)

Henderson*
Sentelle

Tatel

Relief granted.

Am. Corn Growers
Ass’n v. EPA, 291
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(per curiam)

(per curiam)
Edwards
Randolph

Garland
[MPS]

Regulation sustained
in part and vacated in
part.

ExxonMobil Gas Mktg.
Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

Sentelle*
Ginsburg

Edwards

Petitions for review
denied.

Sec’y of Labor, Mine
Safety & Health
Admin. v. Excel
Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

Garland*
Rogers

Sentelle

Petition granted;
reversed.
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Ruggiero v. FCC, 317
F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir.
2003)

Ginsburg*
Edwards
Sentelle
Henderson
Randolph
Rogers

Tatel
[MPS]

Relief denied.

Int’l Alliance of
Theatrical & Stage
Employees v. NLRB,
334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir.
2003)

Sentelle*
Henderson

Tatel

Employers’ and
carpenters’ union’s
petitions granted;
theatrical employees’
union’s petition
dismissed; crossapplication denied.

21st Century Telesis
Joint Venture v. FCC,
318 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir.
2003)

Rogers*
Randolph

Williams
[MPS]

Petition dismissed in
part and denied in
part.

Pub. Util. Comm’n v.
FERC, 367 F.3d 925
(D.C. Cir. 2004)

Randolph*
Sentelle

Rogers

Petition for review
denied.

Honeywell Int’l Inc. v.
EPA, 374 F.3d 1363
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (per
curiam)

(per curiam)
Randolph
Sentelle

Rogers

Vacated and
remanded.

Brewers & Maltsters,
Local Union No. 6 v.
NLRB, 414 F.3d 36
(D.C. Cir. 2005)

Rogers*
Ginsburg

Sentelle
[MPS]

Employer’s petition
denied; union’s
petition granted;
remanded.

Federated Logistics &
Operations v. NLRB,
400 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir.
2005)

Sentelle*
Tatel

Henderson
[MPS]

Petition denied.

Rainbow/PUSH Coal.
v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1235
(D.C. Cir. 2005)

Henderson*
Tatel

Rogers
[MPS]

Appeal dismissed.
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Massachusetts v. EPA,
415 F.3d 50
(D.C. Cir. 2005)

Randolph*
Tatel

Tatel
Sentelle
[MPS]

Petitions dismissed or
denied.

Detroit Newspaper
Agency v. NLRB, 435
F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir.
2006)

Edwards*
Williams

Henderson
[MPS]

Remanded.

Vill. of Bensenville v.
FAA, 457 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 2006)

Rogers*
Henderson

Griffith
[MPS]

Petitions for review
denied.

Am. Council on Educ.
v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226
(D.C. Cir. 2006)

Sentelle*
Brown

Edwards

Petition denied.

Nat’l Ass’n of
Regulatory Util.
Comm’rs v. FERC, 475
F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir.
2007)

Williams*
Edwards

Sentelle
[MPS]

Orders upheld.

Aeronautical Repair
Station Ass’n, Inc. v.
FAA, 494 F.3d 161
(D.C. Cir. 2007)

Henderson*
Tatel

Sentelle
[MPS]

Affirmed in part and
remanded in part.

Am. Chemistry
Council v. Dep’t of
Transp., 468 F.3d 810
(D.C. Cir. 2006)

Griffith*
Sentelle

Rogers

Petitions dismissed.

Ass’n of Irritated
Residents v. EPA, 494
F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.
2007)

Sentelle*
Kavanaugh

Rogers

Petitions dismissed.

Sec’y of Labor, Mine
Safety & Health
Admin. v. Nat’l
Cement Co., 494 F.3d
1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

Henderson*
Sentelle

Rogers

Vacated and
remanded.
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Fin. Planning Ass’n v.
SEC, 482 F.3d 481
(D.C. Cir. 2007)

Rogers*
Kavanaugh

Garland
[MPS]

Petition granted and
rule vacated.

PNC Fin. Servs. Group,
Inc. v. Comm’r,
503 F.3d 119 (D.C. Cir.
2007)

Brown*
Rogers

Griffith
[MPS]

Affirmed.

Natural Res. Def.
Council v. EPA, 489
F.3d 1250 (D.C. Cir.
2007)

Henderson*
Randolph

Rogers

Rules vacated and
remanded.

Pub. Citizen, Inc. v.
Nat’l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., 489
F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir.
2007)

Kavanaugh*
Randolph

Sentelle
[PS]

Petition concerning
Safety Standard 110
was dismissed for lack
of subject matter
jurisdiction; petition
challenging the
adoption of Safety
Standard 138
dismissed for lack of
standing; and action
on petition filed by
Public Citizen
postponed pending the
filing of supplemental
submissions.

Cogeneration Ass’n of
Cal. v. FERC, 525 F.3d
1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

Griffith*
Kavanaugh

Randolph
[PS]

Petition denied.

Ass’n of Civilian
Technicians, N.Y. State
Council v. FLRA, 507
F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir.
2007)

Sentelle*
Griffith

Tatel

Dismissed.

Agri Processor Co. v.
NLRB, 514 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2008)

Tatel*
Henderson

Kavanaugh
[MPS]

Petition denied and
cross-petition granted.
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Am. Bird Conservancy,
Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d
1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(per curiam)

(per curiam)
Rogers
Garland

Kavanaugh

Vacated in part.

Am. Radio Relay
League, Inc. v. FCC,
524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir.
2008)

Rogers*
Tatel

Kavanaugh

Petition granted in
part and remanded.

SUMMARY
Mixed Panel Splits. There were “mixed panel splits” in twenty-two
of the forty-one dispositions—that is, in three-judge panels consisting
of judges appointed by presidents of both political parties, the two
judges appointed by presidents of the same party disagreed; and, in
en banc dispositions, judges appointed by presidents of the same
party joined both the majority and dissent.
Split Panels. Two of the forty-one dissents involved situations in
which all of the judges on the panel were appointed by presidents of
the same political party and one of the judges dissented.
These data indicate that in twenty-four of the forty-one cases in
which a dissent was filed (59 percent), the judges did not vote along
presumed political party lines.
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APPENDIX B
A Sample of Unanimous Decisions Involving “Mixed Panels”
Reviewing Complicated and Important Administrative Agency
Actions September 2000–July 2008
Case Name;
Citation; and
Court Term

Panel and
Judge
Writing (*)

Description from the Court Opinion or
Westlaw

BNSF Ry.
Co. v. Surface
Transp. Bd.,
526 F.3d 770
(D.C. Cir.
2008)

Ginsburg
Rogers
Kavanaugh*

Pirlott v.
NLRB, 522
F.3d 423
(D.C. Cir.
2008)

Randolph,
Rogers
Edwards*

The Surface Transportation Board changed
aspects of its rail rate-setting methodology.
Railroads and shippers both petitioned for
review—railroads arguing that certain
changes improperly benefit shippers and
shippers arguing that certain changes
improperly benefit railroads. The court
concluded that the board’s changes were
reasonable and reasonably explained.
Petitions for review denied.
Bargaining unit employees filed unfair labor
practice charges against their local union,
complaining it violated its duty of fair
representation by spending their dues for
organizing activities and failing to provide
them with adequate financial disclosures. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
found that the union’s financial disclosures
were adequate but determined that the union
had not justified its expenditures. The union
petitioned for review, and the NLRB
cross-applied for enforcement of its order.
The court held that (1) remand was
warranted for NLRB to reconsider the issue
of adequacy of the union’s financial
disclosure in light of intervening case law; (2)
the charging parties were not “aggrieved”
within meaning of National Labor Relations
Act on the issue of whether expenses
incurred in organizing employees of other
employers could ever be charged to
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Maine Pub.
Util. Comm’n
v. FERC, 520
F.3d 464
(D.C. Cir.
2008) (per
curiam)

(per curiam)
Rogers
Garland
Silberman

New Jersey v.
EPA, 517
F.3d 574
(D.C. Cir.
2008)

Rogers*
Tatel
Brown

1975

objectors; and (3) the NLRB did not
arbitrarily depart from precedent,
misconstrue evidence before it, or deny the
union a fair hearing in finding that the
union’s organizing expenses were not
germane to employees. Petition denied,
cross-application granted in part, and case
remanded.
Consolidated petitions for review challenged
the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s (FERC’) approval of a
comprehensive settlement that redesigned
New England’s capacity market. The Maine
Public Utilities Commission and the
attorneys general of Connecticut and
Massachusetts asserted that FERC’s
approval of the settlement was arbitrary and
capricious, contrary to law, and beyond the
commission’s jurisdiction. The court rejected
most of these arguments but agreed with the
petitioners that the commission unlawfully
deprived nonsettling parties of their rights
under the Federal Power Act. Petitions
denied in part, granted in part, and case
remanded.
States and other parties petitioned for review
of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
rules regarding the emission of hazardous air
pollutants from coal- and oil-fired electric
utility steam-generating units. The principal
issue was whether the EPA had authority to
delist coal- and oil-fired utility units without
following statutory delisting provisions. The
court held: Once EPA determined that
certain coal- and oil-fired electric utility
steam generating units were to be regulated
as sources of hazardous air pollutants under
the Clean Air Act, the EPA had no authority
to delist them without following a provision
governing the removal of any source
category. A provision of the Clean Air Act
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Mail
Contractors
of Am. v.
NLRB, 514
F.3d 27 (D.C.
Cir. 2008)

Ginsburg*
Tatel
Brown

Qwest Servs.
Corp. v. FCC,
509 F.3d 531
(D.C. Cir.
2007)

Sentelle
Tatel
Williams*

[Vol. 58:1895

which imposed certain requirements upon
the EPA in delisting certain electric utility
steam generating units as sources of
hazardous air pollutants was not ambiguous,
notwithstanding a separate provision which
allowed the EPA to make a determination as
to whether power plants should be regulated
as emitting hazardous air pollutants; a
provision granting the EPA discretion
governed how the EPA was to decide
whether to list units but said nothing about
delisting units, and had Congress wished to
except units from delisting requirements, it
would have said so explicitly. Petitions
granted and rule vacated.
Court held that the NLRB’s decision, that an
employer violated National Labor Relations
Act when, following an impasse, it
unilaterally imposed provision reserving right
to change truck drivers’ relay points, was
arbitrary and capricious. Petition for review
granted.
Prepaid calling card provider and local
exchange carrier petitioned for review of
order of FCC ruling that both internet
protocol (IP) transport cards, which use IP
technology to transport part or all of
telephone call, and menu-driven cards, which
offer menu-driven interface through which
users can either make call or access several
types of information, offer
“telecommunications services” subject to
payment-of-access charges to local exchange
carriers and other obligations, under
Telecommunications Act, but which
retroactively applied ruling only to
IP-transport cards, but not menu-driven
cards. Holdings: (1) bifurcation of FCC
proceeding was not barred; (2) retroactive
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PAZ Sec.,
Inc. v. SEC,
494 F.3d 1059
(D.C. Cir.
2007)

Ginsburg*
Rogers
Kavanaugh

Owner-Oper
ator Indep.
Drivers Ass’n
v. Fed. Motor
Carrier
Safety
Admin., 494
F.3d 188
(D.C. Cir.
2007)

Ginsburg
Henderson
Garland*

1977

application of order to IP-transport cards was
not manifest injustice; (3) local exchange
carrier had standing; and (4) retroactive
application of order to menu-driven cards
would not be manifest injustice. Order
vacated in part.
Securities firm and its president petitioned
for review of an order of the SEC upholding
the decision of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) to expel firm
from membership and to bar president from
ever associating with any NASD member
firm as sanctions for president’s failure to
respond to the NASD’s repeated requests for
information from and about firm. Court held
that SEC abused its discretion in failing to
address certain mitigating factors raised by
the petitioners, and in failing to identify any
remedial – as opposed to punitive – purpose
for the sanctions it approved. Petitions for
review granted and case remanded for SEC
to consider anew whether the sanctions were
excessive or oppressive
Two groups—one led by public citizen and
the other by the Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association—sought
review of rules adopted by the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration regulating the
hours of commercial long-haul truck drivers.
The court rejected the challenges raised by
the owner-operators, but granted the petition
filed by Public Citizen, Inc. The court
concluded that the agency violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
because it failed to give interested parties an
opportunity to comment on the methodology
of the crash-risk model that the agency used
to justify an increase in the maximum
number of daily and weekly hours that truck
drivers may drive and work. The court also
found that the agency failed to provide an
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San Manuel
Indian Bingo
& Casino v.
NLRB, 475
F.3d 1306
(D.C. Cir.
2007)

Garland
Brown*
Williams

Envtl. Def. v.
EPA, 467
F.3d 1329
(D.C. Cir.
2006)

Randolph
Tatel
Griffith*

EarthLink,
Inc. v. FCC,
462 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir.
2006)

Sentelle
Brown*
Edwards

[Vol. 58:1895

explanation for critical elements of that
methodology. Petition granted in part and
denied in part.
Petitioners claimed that the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) did not apply to
employment at a casino the San Manuel
Band of Serrano Mission Indians operates on
its reservation. Because the casino employed
many non-Indians and catered primarily to
non-Indians, the court upheld the NLRB’s
decision that the NLRA applied to
employment at this casino. The petition for
review was denied.
Environmental organizations brought a
petition for review from final order of EPA
challenging three sets of regulations
governing how states were to bring
transportation plans into conformity with
Clean Air Act. Held: (1) court lacked
jurisdiction to hear belated challenge to
regulation; (2) regulation establishing interim
tests for demonstrating conformity to
National Ambient Air Quality Standards was
unreasonable; and (3) regulation providing
for use of interim tests for making conformity
determinations under State Implementation
Plans was proper. Petition granted in part,
denied in part, and dismissed in part.
The FCC agreed not to require the Bell
Operating Companies to provide their
competitors with “unbundled” access to
certain fiber-based network facilities.
EarthLink, Inc., an internet service provider
that benefits from such unbundling,
challenged the FCC’s order. The court
concluded that the agency’s interpretation
and application of the statutory scheme were
permissible and thus denied the petition for
review.
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In re Core
Commc’ns,
Inc., 455 F.3d
267 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)

Tatel
Garland*
Sentelle

Niagara
Mohawk
Power Corp.
v. FERC, 452
F.3d 822
(D.C. Cir.
2006)

Griffith
Edwards
Silberman*

Goldstein v.
SEC, 451
F.3d 873
(D.C. Cir.
2006)

Randolph*
Edwards
Griffith

1979

Petitioners challenged the FCC’s refusal to
forebear in the enforcement of intercarrier
compensation rules governing
telecommunications traffic bound for
internet service providers. The court found
that FCC’s decision was not arbitrary and
capricious and thus denied the petitions for
review.
New York electric power utilities and the
New York State Public Service Commission
petitioned for review of FERC orders
approving and enforcing a tariff filed by the
New York Independent System Operator
(NYISO), the manager of New York’s
electric power transmission facilities. The
tariff allowed electricity generators that
provided power to the transmission grid to
avoid transmission and local distribution
charges for the power these generators take
from the grid for such purposes as heating,
air conditioning, lighting, and powering office
equipment, so long as the power the
generators produced in any month exceeded
the power taken. Petitioners asserted that
FERC’s approval of monthly netting for
NYISO was unlawful and unreasonable and
that the netting formula imposed in the
NYISO tariff should be supplanted with a
one-hour netting period. The court denied
the petition for review.
The SEC’s hedge-fund rule, requiring that
investors in a hedge fund be counted as
clients of the fund’s adviser for purposes of
fewer-than-fifteen-clients exemption from
registration under Investment Advisers Act,
was invalid as conflicting with purposes
underlying the statute. Rule vacated and case
remanded.
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Nat’l Ass’n of
Sec. Dealers,
Inc. v. SEC,
431 F.3d 803
(D.C. Cir.
2005)

Tatel
Brown
Edwards*

Kidd
Commc’ns v.
FCC, 427
F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2005)

Garland
Silberman*
Williams

[Vol. 58:1895

The National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) wears two institutional
hats: it serves as a professional association,
promoting the interests of it members, and it
serves as a quasi-governmental agency, with
express statutory authority to adjudicate
actions against members who are accused of
illegal securities practices and to sanction
members found to have violated the
Exchange Act or SEC regulations. In NASD
proceeding, the National Adjudicatory
Council disciplined a member and its owner
for, among other things, engaging in a
manipulative scheme. The SEC reversed.
NASD petitioned for review. The court
found that, during the nearly seventy years
that self-regulatory organizations had been
recognized under the Exchange Act,
Congress had never granted NASD a
statutory right to seek judicial review of an
SEC decision reversing disciplinary action
taken by NASD as a first-level adjudicator
under the statute. The court held that NASD,
acting in its adjudicative capacity as a lower
tribunal subject to SEC plenary review of its
disciplinary decisions, was not an “aggrieved
person.” NASD’s petition for review was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Kidd Communications appealed an FCC
decision approving a transfer of Kidd’s radio
station license to Paradise Broadcasting, Inc.,
from whom Kidd originally purchased the
station. The transfer was effected in two steps
pursuant to a California state court order:
first, an involuntary assignment from Kidd to
a trustee, and then the trustee’s voluntary
assignment to Paradise. Kidd challenged the
commission’s decision as inconsistent with
both an FCC regulation prohibiting a seller
from retaining a reversionary interest in a
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S. Cal.
Edison Co. v.
FERC, 415
F.3d 17 (D.C.
Cir. 2005)

Ginsburg
Sentelle*
Rogers

Northpoint
Tech., Ltd. v.
FCC, 412
F.3d 145
(D.C. Cir.
2005)

Edwards
Henderson*
Randolph

1981

station license and the commission’s general
policy prohibiting a license holder from
granting a security interest in a broadcast
license (as opposed to in a station’s physical
assets). The court ruled that the FCC
inadequately explained why these related
policies do not apply and failed to reconcile
them with its competing policy of
accommodating state court decisions.
Decision vacated and case remanded.
Transmission operators (TO) and municipal
customers petitioned for review of FERC
orders disallowing proposed tariff provisions
designed to recover cost differentials from
additional expenses arising out of formation
and maintenance of independent system
operators (ISO). Held: The court ruled that
TOs could recover cost differentials from
new customers. Because the order by FERC
contravened the explicit language of the
FERC-approved ISO tariff schedule to which
the tariffs must conform, the order was
vacated as arbitrary and capricious and the
case remanded.
An applicant for license to provide direct
broadcast satellite (DBS) service petitioned
for review of decision of FCC finding that
agency was authorized to auction licenses to
operate DBS service channels. The court
held that (1) ORBIT Act provision providing
that FCC did not have authority to assign by
competitive bidding orbital locations or
spectrum used for the provision of
international or global satellite
communications services was ambiguous and
(2) FCC’s construction of ORBIT Act
provision as allowing for auction for DBS
licenses was unreasonable. Disputed decision
vacated and case remanded.
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Chamber of
Commerce v.
SEC, 412
F.3d 133
(D.C. Cir.
2005)

Ginsburg*
Rogers
Tatel

Am. Library
Ass’n v.
FCC, 406
F.3d 689
(D.C. Cir.
2005)

Edwards*
Sentelle
Rogers

Nat’l
Treasury
Employees
Union v.
FLRA, 404
F.3d 454
(D.C. Cir.
2005)

Edwards
Sentelle*
Roberts

[Vol. 58:1895

Petitioner sought review of a rule
promulgated by the SEC under the
Investment Company Act. The disputed rule
required that a mutual fund must have a
board (1) with no less than 75 percent
independent directors and (2) an
independent chairman. The court held that
SEC did not exceed its statutory authority in
adopting the two conditions, and the
commission’s rationales for the two
conditions satisfied the APA. But the court
found that the agency did violate the APA by
failing adequately to consider the costs
mutual funds would incur in order to comply
with the conditions and by failing adequately
to consider a proposed alternative to the
independent chairman condition. Petition for
review granted in part and case remanded.
Petitioners challenged FCC’s “broadcast
flag” regulations. A broadcast flag was a
digital code embedded in a DTV
broadcasting stream which prevented digital
television reception equipment from
redistributing broadcast content. The
broadcast flag affects receiver devices only
after a broadcast transmission is complete.
The court held that the FCC acted outside
the scope of its delegated authority when it
adopted the disputed broadcast flag
regulations. Petition granted and rule
vacated.
The Federal Labor Relations Authority erred
in holding that the U.S. Customs Service is
not required to negotiate over a union
proposal concerning the storage of handguns.
Because the authority erred in failing to
follow its own precedent in determining
whether the bargaining proposal constituted
an “appropriate arrangement” subjecting it
to bargainability under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3),
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the agency order was vacated and the case
remanded.
Edison Elec.
Inst. v. EPA,
391 F.3d
1267 (D.C.
Cir. 2004)

Edwards
Randolph*
Williams

Vill. of
Bensenville
v. FAA, 376
F.3d 1114
(D.C. Cir.
2004)

Edwards
Henderson*
Williams

U.S.
Telecom
Ass’n v.
FCC, 359
F.3d 554
(D.C. Cir.
2004)

Edwards
Randolph
Williams*

Edison Electric Institute and corporate and
municipal dischargers brought petitions for
review from final order of Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), alleging that
EPA’s whole effluent toxicity test methods
were invalid. The court held that (1) EPA
accounted for departures from standard
evaluation criteria, (2) EPA accounted for
“false positive” test results, (3) EPA
accounted for failure to establish detection
limits, (4) EPA demonstrated ability of
laboratories to conduct consistent testing,
and (5) EPA established ability of test results
to predict instream effects. Petitions denied.
Three suburbs petitioned for review of
decision by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), which approved
city’s request to impose passenger facility fee
to fund airport modernization program,
alleging violations of the Federal Aviation
Act, APA, National Environmental Policy
Act, and FAA regulations. The court held
that (1) suburbs had standing to challenge the
fee, (2) action was ripe, and (3) FAA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in approving fee.
Petitions granted and case remanded.
Telecommunications service providers
petitioned for review of FCC order
concerning incumbent local exchange
carriers’ (ILEC’) obligation to unbundle
network elements they made available to
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).
Holdings: (1) FCC could not delegate
unbundling decisions to state utility
commissions; (2) finding that CLECs were
impaired absent access to mass market
switches and high-capacity dedicated
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Cal. Indep.
Sys.
Operator
Corp. v.
FERC, 372
F.3d 395
(D.C. Cir.
2004)

Edwards
Sentelle*
Rogers

Sierra Club
v. EPA, 356
F.3d 296
(D.C. Cir.
2004)

Sentelle
Henderson
Garland*
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transport facilities was unreasonable; (3)
FCC could reasonably withhold unbundling
orders, even in face of some impairment of
CLECs’ ability to compete, where such
unbundling would pose excessive
impediments to infrastructure investment;
(4) FCC reasonably declined to unbundle
broadband loops, enterprise market switches,
and call-related databases and signaling
systems; (5) FCC reasonably determined that
ILECs’ anti-impairment unbundling
obligations were distinct from unbundling
obligations they faced as condition for
providing long-distance service; and (6)
criteria established by FCC for determining
whether CLEC was eligible to purchase
unbundled enhanced exchange links were
reasonable. Vacated and remanded in part,
and dismissed in part.
California Independent System Operator
Corporation (CAISO) and two California
agencies petitioned for review of a final order
of FERC replacing the governing board of
CAISO. The court held that FERC did not
have authority under the Federal Power Act
to make or enforce the order.

Petitioner challenged two final actions of the
EPA regarding ozone control plans for the
Washington, D.C. area. The court agreed
with petitioner’s principal contention that
EPA was not authorized to grant conditional
approval to plans that did nothing more than
promise to do tomorrow what the act
requires today. The court vacated the
conditional approval and remanded the
matter to EPA for further action.
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Collins v.
NTSB, 351
F.3d 1246
(D.C. Cir.
2003)

Randolph
Rogers
Williams*

Sierra Club v.
EPA, 325
F.3d 374
(D.C. Cir.
2003)

Randolph
Rogers
Williams*

1985

Commandant of Coast Guard affirmed finding
of an ALJ that Coast Guard–licensed pilot
committed misconduct under 1972
International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea when he failed to sound
warning signal after he ascertained that
another vessel was not taking sufficient action
to avoid collision. National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) reversed determination.
Coast Guard appealed, and pilot intervened.
The court held that (1) commandant was
“person” entitled to appeal the determination;
(2) appeal was timely; (3) at minimum,
Skidmore deference was owed to Coast
Guard’s interpretation of regulation under
treaty; and (4) NTSB erred in failing to defer
to Coast Guard’s reasonable application of
rule to cases where mariners are certain that
“sufficient action” is not “being taken by other
[vessel] to avoid collision.” Reversed and
remanded.
Various environmental groups, two states, and
trucking concerns petitioned for judicial
review of regulations promulgated by the
EPA to regulate emission of toxic chemicals
from fuels. The court held that (1) the section
of the Clean Air Act requiring the EPA to
conduct a study to assess the “need for, and
feasibility of, controlling emissions of toxic air
pollutants” from motor vehicles and then,
“based on” that study, to promulgate
emissions standards to require the greatest
degree of emission reduction achievable in
light of “the availability and costs of the
technology, and noise, energy, and safety
factors, and lead time,” did not make validity
of standards dependent on that of initial study;
(2) EPA’s decision to adopt mere
antibacksliding rule to prevent toxic emissions
from increasing above historic levels rather
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than more aggressive emissions cap was not
arbitrary or capricious; (3) EPA did not
sufficiently explain its decision not to require
on-board diagnostic equipment for new
heavy-duty vehicles over 14,000 pounds; and
(4) EPA’s decision merely to list diesel
exhaust as mobile air toxic that would be
considered for purposes of future regulation
did not present any issue ripe for judicial
review. Petitioners’ claims denied in part,
remanded in part, and dismissed as unripe in
part.
Motion
Picture Ass’n
of Am., Inc.
v. FCC, 309
F.3d 796
(D.C. Cir.
2002)

Edwards*
Henderson
Rogers

Petitioners challenged FCC rules mandating
television programming with video
descriptions. The court ruled that the statute
does not instruct (or even permit) the FCC to
promulgate regulations mandating video
descriptions. The court reversed and vacated
the FCC’s order.

U.S. Air
Tour Ass’n v.
FAA, 298
F.3d 997
(D.C. Cir.
2002)

Edwards
Henderson
Garland*

Air tour operators and environmental
organizations petitioned for review of FAA
rule imposing cap on total number of
commercial air tours that operators could run
in Grand Canyon National Park. The court
held that (1) FAA’s change in its noise
evaluation methodology for air tours was not
arbitrary and capricious, (2) rule did not
ignore needs of elderly and disabled, (3)
challenges to rule raised by environmental
groups were ripe for review, (4) remand was
required to determine whether FAA
unlawfully altered National Park Service’s
definition of “substantial restoration of the
natural quiet” in the Overflights Act, and (5)
FAA’s noise-methodology supporting rule
was arbitrary and capricious. Petitions granted
in part, denied in part, and case remanded.
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Sierra Club v.
EPA, 292
F.3d 895
(D.C. Cir.
2002)

Ginsburg*
Sentelle
Tatel

U.S. Telecom
Ass’n v. FCC,
290 F.3d 415
(D.C. Cir.
2002)

Edwards
Randolph
Williams*

Town of
Stratford v.
FAA, 285
F.3d 84 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)

Rogers
Garland
Silberman*

1987

The Environmental Protection Agency
promulgated a rule to establish the conditions
under which it would consider certain
wastewater treatment sludges “hazardous”
within the meaning of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
The Sierra Club and the Environmental
Technology Council challenged the rule as
unreasonable and as inconsistent with the
plain meaning of the RCRA. The court
dismissed the petitions because neither
petitioner had standing to seek review.
Incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs)
petitioned for judicial review of orders of the
FCC which adopted uniform national rule that
required ILECs to lease variety of unbundled
networks elements to competitive local
exchange carriers (CLECs) in all geographic
markets and customer classes and which
ordered the unbundling of high frequency
spectrum of copper loop to enable CLECs to
provide digital subscriber line service. The
court held that (1) FCC’s “impairment”
standard was unlawful because it chose to
adopt uniform national rule without regard to
state of competitive impairment in any
particular market and (2) FCC should not
have entered unbundling order without first
considering relevance of competition in
broadband services coming from cable and, to
lesser extent, satellite. Petitions for review
granted and case remanded.
The town of Stratford petitioned for review of
an FAA decision concerning the
Bridgeport-Sikorsky Memorial Airport and
disposal of land from the Stratford Army
Engine Plant. The court concluded that
Stratford lacked prudential standing to pursue
its claims that the FAA’s Environmental
Impact Statement was inadequate under the
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National Environmental Policy Act and that
its remaining claims were without merit.
Stratford’s petition was therefore denied.
The court agreed with the university that it
was exempt from NLRB jurisdiction as a
religiously operated institution under the
doctrine of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). No Chevron
deference was required. In applying the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the court
inquired whether the university (a) held itself
out to the public as a religious institution, (b)
was nonprofit, and (c) was religiously
affiliated. Finding that the university met
these criteria, the decision and order of NLRB
were vacated.
The EPA exceeded its authority under the
Clean Air Act in proposing to promulgate and
administer a federal operating permits
program for areas where EPA believes the
Indian country status is in question and in
proposing to make state/tribe jurisdictional
determinations on a case-by-case basis rather
than through notice and comment rulemaking.
Chapter 11 debtor challenged authority of
FCC to cancel its broadband personal
communications service (PCS) licenses for
failure to make purchase price installment
payments. The court held that (1) circuit
appellate court’s decision reversing
bankruptcy court’s determination that FCC
could not cancel licenses was based on the
bankruptcy court’s lack of jurisdiction rather
than on merits of underlying dispute and thus
was not res judicata except for those issues
actually decided and (2) FCC was barred from
canceling licenses solely for debtor’s failure to
make installment payments after declaring
bankruptcy. Reversed and remanded.
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Consumer reporting agency petitioned for
review of order of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) holding that agency’s sale
of certain mailing lists containing names of
consumers who met specific criteria was
communication of “consumer reports” for a
purpose that was impermissible under Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The court held
that (1) agency did not properly challenge
FTC’s statutory interpretation or launch
specific substantial evidence challenge on its
key findings, (2) FCRA was not
unconstitutionally vague under Fifth
Amendment due process guarantees, and (3)
ban on sale of lists did not violate credit
reporting agency’s First Amendment rights.
Petition for review denied.
This court addressed FCC regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992. It held that the horizontal rule was in
excess of statutory authority, that the vertical
rule did not survive intermediate scrutiny
under the First Amendment, that the
elimination of the majority shareholder
exception was arbitrary and capricious, but
that the basic 5 percent rule and 33 percent
equity-and-debt rule were not arbitrary and
capricious. Reversed and remanded in part
and affirmed in part.

